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RISK AS AN ARENA OF STRUGGLE 
Richard L. Abel* 
GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASON-
ABLENESS. By Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 1982. Pp. xxii, 375. Cloth, $29.95; paper, 
$12.95. 
THE OTHER PRICE OF BRITAIN'S OIL: SAFETY AND CONTROL IN 
THE NORTH SEA. By W. G. Carson. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press. 1982. Pp. xi, 320. $27.50. 
WORKERS AT RISK: VOICES FROM THE WORKPLACE. By Dorothy 
Ne/kin and Michael S. Brown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1984. Pp. xvii, 220. $20. 
The legal response to risk used to be confined to tort law, which 
was conceived as the quintessential private law subject. It was taught 
in the first year of law school and rarely thereafter. Scholars wrote 
endless articles about proximate cause. Yet the boundary between 
public and private law never was observed. Morton Horwitz has 
shown us that tort law played an essential role in resource allocation 
in the nineteenth century.1 Workers' compensation was the focus of 
constant struggle around the tum of the century. And recently legisla-
tures have introduced public law solutions to the risks that arise in 
automobile travel, pollution, the use of consumer products, the work-
place, encounters with crime, medical care - the list is virtually end-
less. The fundamentally political nature of the struggle over who will 
inflict risk on whom and with what consequences no longer can be 
obscured. During the second Reagan administration these struggles 
will become more acute and more visible. The three books reviewed 
here inescapably are part of that struggle. The first is a thinly dis-
guised apology for capital. Bardach and Kagan urge that the state 
defer to capital, which will exhibit paternalistic concern for the risks it 
inflicts on all citizens. The other two books openly champion the vic-
tims. Carson locates the source of risk in the political economy of 
Britain's North Sea oil exploration. Nelkin and Brown allow victims 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A. 1962, Harvard University; 
LL.B. 1965, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1974, University of London. - Ed. 
1. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 63-108 
(1977); Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE PoLmcs OP LAW 201 (D. Kairys 
ed. 1982). 
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to speak about their struggles to control risk in the workplace. Schol-
arly disagreement over the response to risk mirrors the political strug-
gle between those who inflict it and those who suffer it. 
I. MALIGN NEGLECT 
In Going by the Book, Bardach and Kagan direct their criticism 
against the regulatory agencies that enforce environmental, worker 
health and safety, and other "social" regulations. Their object is to 
show that much regulation is unwarranted and its enforcement 
counterproductive2 and to propose an alternative. The villain of the 
piece is the "unreasonable" inspector who follows the letter of the law. 
Evaluating this book poses serious difficulties, chiefly because the 
empirical status of the authors' arguments is unclear. They base their 
judgments about the "reasonableness" of regulatory behavior almost 
entirely on discussions with the owners and managers of regulated in-
dustries and virtually never talk to those the regulations were intended 
to benefit - workers, in most instances. As we shall see, 3 the latter 
offer a very different assessment. Even among the regulated industries, 
however, Bardach and Kagan make no effort to obtain a representa-
tive sample. Indeed, it is not clear that they are describing reality at 
all. In their one explicit discussion of method they concede: 
Our objectives . . . are more analytical than empirical. Hence any er-
rors in interpreting a firm's real motives are not damaging to our argu-
ment, as long as responses of the kind we describe are plausible responses 
to legalistic enforcement and occur in the world with at least some fre-
quency. [P. 113 n.27.] 
This attitude toward evidence may explain why the authors sometimes 
concoct "quotations," which they present as what some unreasonable 
inspector might have said (pp. 85-86), why they offer imaginary ac-
counts of what a regulatory· agency legally might do as proof of its 
unreasonableness in fact,4 and why, while acknowledging the dangers 
of generalization, they repeatedly present horror stories as representa-
tive examples (pp. xiii, 7). It is difficult to criticize the social science of 
"as if."5 
If Bardach and Kagan are cavalier in their treatment of evidence, 
at least they are explicit about their political allegiances. They begin 
the book by declaring that they are "greatly pleased" at the "general 
direction and strength" of "the Republican regulatory counter-revolu-
tion in mid-1981" (p. xii), and later they extol those "heroes in regula-
2. For an empirically grounded argument that Canadian regulation is neither excessive nor 
onerous, see Nemetz, Sturdy, Uyeno, Vertinsky, Vertinsky & Vining, Toxic Chemical Regulation 
in Canada: Preliminary Estimates of Costs and Benefits, 25 CANADIAN PUB. AD. 405 (1982). 
3. See Part III infra. 
4. See, e.g., pp. 51-53 (examples of authorized fines, not those imposed). 
5. Cf. H. V AIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF" (1925). 
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tory affairs" who have relaxed rules and withheld sanctions (p. 213).6 
Although the authors began with some concerns about the effective-
ness of regulation, they concluded that so many others were studying 
the problem that they would do better to focus on unreasonableness 
(p. xv, n. *). They quote approvingly those who argue that excessive 
government spending and regulation have been responsible for high 
inflation, interest rates, and unemployment (pp. 14-15). And they in-
voke the fear that strict enforcement can drive entrepreneurs out of 
business (p. 137). Occasionally they reveal that their antipathy to en-
forcement actually reflects their opposition to the substance of the reg-
ulation. Thus, they are unhappy with affirmative action programs 
designed to redress discrimination or disadvantage.7 And, similarly, 
they seem to find acceptable the present level of risk in the environ-
ment and at work. 8 Bardach and Kagan, in short, favor the status 
quo. 
The authors also disclose their politics in the image of society that 
underlies their critique of regulation. For Bardach and Kagan, the 
good society, which we can and should try to achieve, is the "well-
ordered society" (p. xi), in which order is identified with submission 
to authority. It is a society without serious structural conflicts: 
"[e]xplanations of American politics that rely heavily on the idea of 
'class' have never been very satisfactory" (p. 17). Members of this 
society respect "the basic norm of reciprocity that is essential to all 
cooperative relationships" (p. 106). Relationships can be cooperative 
because capital is essentially well-meaning and benevolent: 
"[M]anagers have at least some concern about the same social 
problems that preoccupy the regulators ... " (p. 132). Indeed, most 
capitalists wish to comply with reasonable regulations. The authors 
assume (without any evidence whatsoever) that eighty percent of en-
trepreneurs are "arrayed over a spectrum of borderline to moderate to 
really good apples" (p. 65).9 
6. For accounts of this counterrevolution, see J. CLAYBROOK, RETREAT FROM SAFETY: 
REAGAN'S Arr ACK ON AMERICA'S HEALTH (1984); M. PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGU· 
LATION: THE RlsE AND PAUSE OF THE CoNSUMER MOVEMENT (1982); THE REAGAN REC· 
ORD: AN AssESSMENT OF AMERICA'S CHANGING DOMESTIC PRIORmES (J. Palmer & I. 
Sawhill eds. 1984); s. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DE· 
REGULATE (1983). 
It is instructive to contrast the authors' paean to deregulators with the position of Leonard 
Homer, the champion of the nineteenth-century British Factory Acts. See 1 K. MARX, CAPITAL 
340-416 (B. Fowkes trans. 1977); MEMOIR OF LEONARD HORNER (K. Lyell ed. 1890); Martin, 
Leonard Homer: A Portrait of an Inspector of Factories, 14 INTL. REV. Soc. HIST. 412 (1969). 
7. See, e.g., pp. 21, 50, 71, 199, 241, 322. 
8. Thus they suggest that the level of work accidents was acceptable until "new hires" drove 
it upward, p. 105, and are prepared to tolerate the industry average oflost workday injuries. P. 
162. They endorse the "bubble" concept and an offset policy with respect to air pollution, both 
of which would allow pollution to increase in some places if it declines in others. See pp. 175, 
298. 
9. They invoke the research of Keith Hawkins on the regulation of water pollution in Britain 
in support of this position. But Hawkins actually says something quite different: 
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What, then, is the problem? Why do we not find the "cooperative 
relationships" that underlie the "well-ordered society"? The serpents 
in this garden are the regulator and the worker. Regulators are too 
tough, unyielding, formalistic. The authors urge us to "think of [regu-
latory] unreasonableness as an epidemic sort of injury inflicted on soci-
ety by careless regulators . . . or as a form of injustice inflicted by the 
strong upon the weak" (p. 305). But regulators really are just the 
pawn of the workers - the real culprits, the origin of the "threat of 
unreasonableness" (pp. 230-31). Workers are likely to "abuse" their 
right to refuse to work in highly dangerous situations (p. 230).10 This 
view of relations between labor, capital, and the state reminds me of 
nothing so much as the claim by many Southern whites in the 1950's 
and 1960's: our Negroes like the way we treat them; it's just those 
outside agitators who stir up trouble. 
In this peaceable kingdom, conflict not only is the product of "un-
reasonable" resistance by the victims rather than risk inflicted by em-
ployers and polluters but also is attributed to defects in individual 
character rather than to structural opposition. I I If some twenty per-
cent of capitalists are recalcitrant, it is because they have a bad "atti-
tude" (pp. 99-100), or perhaps because they have developed a "culture 
of resistance" (p. 114) through experiencing regulatory unreasonable-
ness. Conflict is aggravated by "tough" inspectors and thus can be 
Securing compliance is a game to be played, in which the polluter's moves are directed 
toward resisting efforts at enforcement. Such resistance is portrayed as a ritual response even 
from a polluter who will be described as responsible or cooperative. For dischargers to "try 
it on" or "try to pull a fast one" is thought to be entirely normal behavior; they are expected 
to drag their heels or seek to avoid adopting in their full extent the measures required by the 
officer; "usually people are pretty slow to spend money," said an area man, "no matter 
which sector of the public they come from." 
Hawkins, Bargain and Bluffi Compliance Strategy and Dete"ence in the Enforcement of Regula-
tion, 5 LAW & POLY. Q. 35, 44 (1983). It is hard to imagine how anyone could expect it to be 
otherwise. 
Bardach and Kagan also urge emulation of the Swedish experience, pp. 230-31, but Swedish 
entrepreneurs offered no opposition to the enactment of health and safety legislation and regula-
tions. Fleischauer, Occupational Safety and Health Law in Sweden and the United States: Are 
There Lessons to Be Learned by Both Countries?, 6 HAsrlNGs INTL. & CoMP. L. REv. 283, 303 
(1983). 
To offer an illustration closer to home, "the [Los Angeles] City Attorney's office has charged 
the Todd Shipyards Corporation, one of the nation's largest shipbuilders, with illegally disposing 
of polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCB's, by arranging to have the toxic chemical hauled to the 
Mojave Desert." Shipyard Charged in Illegal PCB Disposal on Coast, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1983, 
at 39, col. 1. The City Attorney alleged that the company had obtained a bid of $43,915 to 
dispose of the transformers and oil legally but decided instead to have them removed on a no-
questions-asked basis. "Tests at the Park Metal Company, where the transformers were disman-
tled, showed the level of contamination as high as 71,000 parts per million, and contamination on 
a suburban street was 56,565 parts per million." Id. The legal limit is 50 ppm. The only dumps 
authorized to accept PCBs are in Louisiana and Arkansas. Id. I doubt that Bardach and Kagan 
would characterize Todd Shipyards as a "bad apple." 
10. For a discussion of the right of workers to refuse dangerous work, see note 126 infra and 
accompanying text. 
11. For a critical view of this tendency to blame everything on "operator error," see C. PER-
ROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RlsK TECHNOLOGIES 9, 246-49 (1984). 
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eliminated or at least alleviated by "good" inspectors who have an 
"ability to get along with people" (pp. 123-24, 127). 
Bardach and Kagan construct a model of society that fundamen-
tally mystifies power. In their world workers harass managers (p. 
231), regulators are strong and regulated industries weak (p. 305).12 
The authors appear wholly insensitive to the possibility that workers 
may fear to complain in front of their bosses and risk ·retaliation (pp. 
147-48, 168, 231).13 They further obscure power relationships by 
drawing wildly inappropriate analogies between the regulator con-
fronting the corporation and the police officer seeking to control 
"gatherings of juveniles or domestic quarrels" (p. 125). Inspection 
punishes a corporation, the authors suggest, in the same way that "the 
process is the punishment" when minor individual offenders are prose-
cuted criminally but ultimately discharged without fine or imprison-
ment (p. 163). And they note that "parents are not licensed for safety 
and effectiveness," implying that capital need not be either (p. 304). 
But the corporation does not resemble the individual accused, the ado-
lescent, the abusive husband, or the parent - in either power, motiva-
tion, or resources. To substitute one for the other is to reduce class 
conflict to a domestic tiff. 14 Bardach and Kagan also draw a false 
analogy between the consumer and the worker (p. 246). Because the 
former appears to exercise the "liberty" to choose among consumer 
products, trading off safety and quality for price, so the worker does, 
12. A recent empirical study found that about half of several categories of inspectors in Wis· 
consin had experienced threats or physical abuse at the hands of the industries they regulated. 
Frank, Assaults Against Inspectors: The Dangers in Enforcing Corporate Crime, 6 LAW & POLY. 
361 (1984). 
13. Workers are said to be "protected" by their right to sue for reinstatement if fired for 
reporting regulatory violations. P. 229. For a description of worker fears, see note 117 infra and 
accompanying text. 
14. The authors' strategy is similar to that of the tobacco companies, which seek to portray 
the infliction of passive smoking on nonsmokers as an interpersonal conflict. Taking full page 
advertisements in major newspapers "in the interest of common courtesy," R.J. Reynolds To· 
bacco Co. depicts the nonsmoker as suffering something between a "minor nuisance" and a "real 
annoyance" - never illness or death. Nonsmokers feel "a little powerless" in the invasion of 
their "privacy." Smokers, on the, other hand, have made "a very personal choice" of something 
that gives them "enjoyment." They are "doing something perfectly legal,'' yet they are "segre· 
gated, discriminated against, even legislated against." N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, (Magazine), 
at 97. (I am particularly offended by this appropriation by the tobacco companies of the concept 
of discrimination against racial minorities, women, the disabled, and the elderly.) 
This dispute is not between individuals but between the majority of nonsmokers and the 
tobacco companies that have fostered addiction to nicotine. See C. PERROW, supra note 11, at 
312; P. TAYLOR, THE SMOKE RlNG: TOBACCO, MONEY, AND MULTINATIONAL POLITICS 
(1984). Furthermore, the dispute is about illness and death, not "nuisances" or "annoyances." 
Studies in the United States, Britain, and Japan have documented an increase in lung cancer 
deaths among nonsmokers exposed to smokers. In the United States, passive smoking is esti-
mated to cause between 500 and 5000 deaths a year, making it far more serious a threat than 
coke oven emissions, vinyl choloride, or benzene. Molotsky, E.P.A. Study Links Deaths of Non· 
smokers to Cigarette, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1984, at 8, col. 1. Yet Reynolds continues to maintain 
that "there is little evidence - and certainly nothing which proves scientifically - that cigarette 
smoke causes disease in non-smokers." TIME, July 23, 1984, at 48 (emphasis in original). 
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and should, have the same "moral autonomy" to exchange bodily 
safety for higher wages (p. 246). This, of course, is precisely the com-
modification of labor by capitalism that obscures the compulsion and 
exploitation of workers in the guise of "freedom of contract."15 
15. The problem with equating workers and consumers is that, while consumers are free to 
buy any product they can afford, workers cannot choose any job; they are restricted by age, race, 
class, education, experience, gender, and geography, among other factors. Whereas the con-
sumer can switch products or services with little or no cost, the worker is likely to experience at 
least temporary and possibly permanent unemployment - an unacceptable cost to anyone. The 
worker also must abandon the workmates and friends of a lifetime and may have to relinquish 
skills whose exercise gives great satisfaction. For the critique of the commodification of labor, 
which is at the root of economic analysis, see K. MARx, supra note 6, at 270-82; Abel, A Socialist 
Approach to Risk, 41 Mo. L. REv. 695 (1982); Young, Marx on Bourgeois Law, 2 REsEARCH IN 
L. & Soc. 133 (1979). 
Economists who explore "compensating differentials for risk" necessarily contribute to this 
mystification. One of the most extensive analyses of wage differentials, W. VIScusr, RrsK BY 
CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 37 (1983), begins: 
Exposure to various risks is an intrinsic aspect of many daily activities. Car travel may lead 
to accidents and even death, plane flights raise the risk of cancer and pose the risk of a crash, 
and the foods we eat create a seemingly endless variety of carcinogenic hazards. . • • Par-
ticipating in sports is an enjoyable form of recreation despite the risk of injury. Other risks 
are incurred for financial reasons, as in the case of the five hundred people who are electro-
cuted each year installing their own TV and CB radio antennas in an effort to avoid profes-
sional installation charges. 
Workers make similar choices. 
They do not. 
Economists are led into dangerous absurdities by their erroneous starting point. For in-
stance, they calculate the value a worker places on his life from the wage differential the worker 
receives for a more dangerous job and conclude that non-manual workers value their lives almost 
four times as highly as manual workers. Marin & Psacharopoulos, The Reward for Risk in the 
Labor Market: Evidence from the United Kingdom and a Reconciliation with Other Studies, 90 J. 
POL. EcoN. 827 (1982). From this they deduce that "those prepared to work in ••. exception-
ally risky jobs may well have a lower dislike of danger .•.. " Id. at 841. The callousness of this 
remark recalls the assertions by the American military that it was morally acceptable to bomb 
civilian Vietnamese populations because the Vietnamese did not value life as highly as Ameri-
cans. For more cautious views on risk premiums, see M. GUNDERSON & K. SWINTON, CoLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AND AsBESTOS DANGERS AT THE WORKPLACE (1980); W. VISCUS!, 
EMPLOYMENT HAzARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE (1979); Chelius, 
The Control of Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence, 38 LA w & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 700, 714 (1974). For a critique of the ,application of cost-benefit analysis to worker 
health and safety standards, see Tucker, The Determination of Occupational Health and Safety 
Standards in Ontario, 1860-1982: From the Market to Politics to . • . ?, 29 McGILL L.J. 260, 297-
309 (1983). 
Even were we to find two jobs, similar in training, experience, and responsibility but different 
in risk, that were paid differently, we would know only that people are risk aversive and that 
their preferences have some effect on wages. But this certainly does not prove that the particular 
difference correctly reflects the value workers place on risk, nor does it show that regulation and 
compensation are unnecessary. Even economists sometimes concede this. See McLean, 
Wendling & Neergaard, Compensating Wage Differentials for Hazardous Work: An Empirical 
Analysis, Q. REv. EcoN. & Bus., Autumn 1978, at 97, 105. 
Economists rarely ask workers whether they would prefer higher wages in exchange for 
greater risks. A British survey asked respondents which of three jobs they would choose if, all 
else being equal, job A had an average amount of risk and reasonable pay, job B had twice as 
much risk and paid £10 more a week, and job C had three times as much risk and paid £20 more 
a week. Two-thirds of all respondents chose job A. Women were more reluctant to accept a 
riskier job for higher pay. Those in relatively risk-free work environments also were more reluc-
tant and demanded higher risk premiums. P. PRESCOTT-CLARKE, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO-
WARDS INDUSTRIAL, WORK-RELATED AND OrHER RrsKS 145-49 (1982). This suggests that 
people do not choose risk but strongly prefer the least risky work environment they believe they 
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Looking at the world through the political and sociological lenses 
just described, Bardach and Kagan offer an explanation for the growth 
of regulation and the opposition it engenders, a critique of regulation, 
and proposals for an alternative. Their explanation inverts the cus-
tomary understanding: regulation is not a response to special interests 
but an expression of those interests. Yet where the revisionist histori-
ans see these special interests as capital, 16 Bardach and Kagan appro-
priate that term (in a prime example ofNewspeak) to refer to the mass 
of workers or the general public (p. 16). Since these latter do not en-
gage in spontaneous mass action, the authors must affix the blame else-
where, indulging in the genetic fallacy to impugn the value of 
regulation by associating it with undesirable elements. They attribute 
pressure for regulation to unions (p. 16), the civil rights and anti-war 
movements (p. 13), "senators looking for issues with wide public sup-
port" (p. 14), "young lawyers" (p. 14), the "intelligentsia" (p. 17), and 
of course the media (p. 23)17 - all of which they characterize as "dan-
gerous potential predators" infesting "the political environment of reg-
ulatory officials" (p. 206). They attribute extraordinary influence to 
these forces: "During the 1960's and 1970's, these risks [of being criti-
cized for leniency] were generally more threatening to regulators than 
were the risks of criticism from the business side ... " (p. 198).18 To 
the extent that such external forces do not explain the growth of regu-
lation, Bardach and Kagan attribute it to spontaneous changes in per-
sonality - the "newly evolved, tougher breed of inspector" (p. 123); 
to "intermittent events" that are merely chance occurrences, not the 
product of any structural forces; 19 and to the inevitable tendency of 
can obtain, that blue-collar workers see no alternative to certain risks but are unwilling to accept 
more, and that white-collar workers enjoy a relatively risk-free environment and are very reluc-
tant to accept any greater risk, even for a substantial wage premium. 
16. See, e.g., G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CoNSERVATISM (1963); J. WEINSTEIN, THE 
CoRPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918 (1968). Bardach and Kagan do concede 
that competition among capitalists may be a spur to regulation. Pp. 18, 200. 
17. The circumstances in which the media can be effective in arousing public opinion are 
narrowly limited. For an example of a successful campaign against an Australian asbestos manu-
facturer, see Braithwaite & Fisse, Asbestos and Health: A Case of Informal Social Control, 61 
AUST. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 67 (1983); see also B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT 
OF PUBLICITY ON CoRPORATE OFFENDERS (1983). In the Australian case, the manufacturer 
simply moved its fabricating facilities to Indonesia, which has no controls on asbestos exposure. 
Similarly, a Hamburg asbestos factory was dismantled and reconstructed in Capetown, South 
Africa. Braithwaite & Fisse, supra, at 69, 77. Lay judgments about the magnitude of risks seem 
to be strongly influenced by the experience of victimization but not by media campaigns. Tyler, 
Assessing the Risk of Crime Victimization: The Integration of Personal Victimization Experience 
and Socially Transmitted Information, 40 J. Soc. Iss. 27 (1984). 
18. Bardach and Kagan deplore criticism of regulators for failing to inspect sanitary viola-
tions in the food processing industry, for failing to respond to complaints of discrimination, and 
for failing to conduct sufficiently rigorous inspections of building code violations, unsanitary 
conditions in restaurants, slum housing, and nursing homes. Pp. 204-07. 
19. "Most prominent are physical catastrophes; scandals that expose presumptive laxity, cor-
ruption, or incompetency in the regulatory agency; dramatic scientific discoveries; flare-ups of 
racial or interco=unal violence; and changes in administration ••.• " P. 22. 
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regulation to expand and rigidify (p. 184). No mention is made of 
changes in the physical environment that might call for greater regula-
tion or shifts in the configuration of political power that might explain 
why those who favor regulation temporarily prevailed. 
Bardach and Kagan stay on the other side of the looking glass 
when explaining opposition to regulation: it is not resistance by regu-
lated industries (compelled by the dynamic of capitalism) that engen-
ders more vigorous enforcement but "regulatory unreasonableness" 
that drives otherwise compliant entrepreneurs to reluctant opposition 
(p. 26). Regulation destroys the "generalized commitment . . . 'to 
comply with the law' " (p. 113). The problem is "legalistic narrow-
mindedness" in enforcement (p. 92), which can spawn an organized 
culture of resistance (p. 114). Corporations are outraged by fines they 
view as undeserved, even if the fines are small (pp. 52, 105). They 
conceal information, even solutions to safety problems, out of fear of 
and resentment toward regulation (pp. 109, 145)20 and anger at the 
aggressive behavior of the public interest lobby (p. 256). Unfortu-
nately, the authors offer no evidence for their assertion that capital has 
a "generalized commitment" to comply with the law;21 that, absent 
regulation, it spontaneously enhances safety and reduces pollution; or 
that it voluntarily discloses dangers and safety solutions. Indeed, their 
own evidence shows that capital vigorously opposes the enactment of 
regulations (p. 189),22 conceals information in order to secure compet-
itive advantages (p. 110), and initiates legalistic objections in order to 
reduce both inspections and prosecutions (pp. 113, 118-19). 
The authors' view of the pressures for and against regulation sets 
the stage for their critique. Bardach and Kagan begin with a structural 
explanation for why regulation tends to be unreasonable.23 Rules in-
20. In fact, they do so because of the goad of competition. The 80 nuclear power plants 
operating in the United States do not share information about failures or accidents. Partly as a 
result, they experience six and a half times as many shutdowns as Japanese plants, which do 
share information. Some of the problems that led to the incident at Three-Mile Island (TMI) 
had occurred previously at similar plants, but TMI was unaware of these events or the responses 
of the plant operators. After TMI the industry created a private Institute for Nuclear Power 
Operations, endowed with massive resources and personnel. But operators remain reluctant to 
give it data: only 21 of the 104 component failures in the first half of 1983 were reported to the 
Institute. Nevertheless, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has delegated responsibility for re-
cording such incidents to the Institute. Report Faults Data on Nuclear Plant Mishaps, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 25, 1984, at 36, col. 1. These events counsel skepticism about the enthusiasm that 
Bardach and Kagan display for self-regulation. See notes 67-73 infra and accompanying text. 
21. Last year CCS Communication Control, Inc. sold $20 million of devices that detect elec-
tronic bugs, evidence of either corporate paranoia or an extraordinary amount of illegal eaves-
dropping and telephone tapping in the pursuit of trade secrets. See King, Growth of Industrial 
Spying Bringing Profit to a New Business, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1984, at 30, col. 2. 
22. For an early account of industry resistance to environmental regulation, see N. GUN-
NINGHAM, POLLUTION, SOCIAL INTEREST AND THE LAW (1974). 
23. For a detailed empirical account of the actual behavior of OSHA in setting health regula-
tions, which strongly contradicts the claim by Bardach and Kagan that it has been overly rigid 
and insufficiently responsive to the industry, see D. MCCAFFREY, OSHA AND THE PoLmcs OF 
HEALTH REGULATION (1982). For an analysis of the ways in which courts can interpret statu-
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evitably are overinclusive (p. 25) because government can act only by 
means of generalizations. Furthermore, the ideology of equality 
before the law continually encourages the extension of rules to new 
settings (p. 67). In order to permit inspectors to monitor compliance, 
regulations must insist on simple and easily measurable proxies for the 
desired behavior (p. 70). These objections are sound, if hardly novel. 
But the authors then purport to quantify the harm caused by overin-
clusion and by the crudeness of the indicators of compliance. First, 
they assert, without any evidence, that about eighty percent of all busi-
nesses either already have attained the goals that regulation seeks or 
will conform to rules without any inspections or sanctions (pp. 65-
66). 24 For such enterprises, regulation is wasted effort and may be 
seriously counterproductive. Second, Bardach and Kagan blame regu-
latory unreasonableness on the inspectors themselves. They are exces-
sively theoretical, insufficiently disciplined by experience (pp. 154-55), 
hypersensitive to risk (p. 82), inattentive to the costs of compliance 
(pp. 154-55), and more concerned with winning cases than solving 
problems (pp. 79-80). 25 Once again the authors conclude these gener-
alizations (which undoubtedly are true of some inspectors some of the 
time) with a wholly unsupported estimate of their significance: 
"clashes between the official and the civilian perspectives" are "com-
mon indeed"; the absolute number is "very high" (p. 79). This seems 
sharply inconsistent with the authors' earlier assertion that eighty per-
cent of all entrepreneurs comply without any enforcement. 
Bardach and Kagan supplement these unsubstantiated conclusions 
with what they claim are specific instances of regulatory abuse. But 
on inspection these prove to be nothing of the sort. The outer limits of 
regulatory power are presented as descriptions of the actual exercise of 
those powers, when the evidence in this book alone shows that such 
authority rarely is invoked. Bardach and Kagan maintain that "in-
spectors are regularly engaged in searches and seizures, often without 
'probable cause' " (p. 32), and that "inspectors in some agencies are 
granted summary powers to impose severe restrictions ... [which] 
raise the possibility of misuse" (p. 32). But all the authors have shown 
is the "possibility of misuse," not the reality. In a chapter tenden-
tiously entitled "Toward Toughness," they deplore the fact that regu-
latory agencies are authorized to seek corporate fines as high as $25-
tory language so as to provide adequately specified health and safety standards, see Latin, The 
Feasibility of Occupational Health Standards: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncer-
tainty, 18 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 583 (1983). 
24. A useful antidote to such polyannaism is Charles Perrow's description of the safety 
records of nuclear energy, the petrochemical industry, air and marine travel, dams, and mining 
- all highly regulated acivities. See C. PERROW, supra note 11. 
25. Somehow the authors overlook the fact that inspectors only have authority to order com-
pliance with rules; their suggestions for "solving problems" are likely to be ignored. See note 83 
infra and accompanying text. 
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50,000 a day, to request the imprisonment or fining of corporate of-
ficers, and to impose regulatory penalties without judicial intervention 
(pp. 51-52). Yet their only concrete example of punishment is a large 
aluminum manufacturer with numerous plants who was fined a total 
of $25,000 for 225 citations over a period of seven years, an average of 
$3500 a year and $15.56 a citation (p. 4). They insist, without evi-
dence, that small civil penalties are "troublillg even to very large cor-
porations. "26 Yet even these mild fines rarely are imposed; the record 
of regulatory enforcement is actually one of extreme laxity, not 
rigidity.27 
26. P. 52. This is a very strange approach to punishment - the notion that the sensitivities 
of the offender should be taken into account. But eventually it becomes clear that Bardach and 
Kagan believe that entrepreneurs do nothing wrong when they violate regulations and endanger 
person and property: 
[V]iolations often involve failure to take some precaution that only might lead to harm. . . . 
Moreover, regulatory offenses often are not clearly wrong, as are theft and assault. Unlike 
the burglar or the narcotics dealer, the regulatory offender often is a legitimate, socially 
useful enterprise whose officers believe sincerely, and sometimes justifiably, that their behav-
ior was not really very bad. 
P. 42 (emphasis in original). Of course, most criminals also think they are justified, and outside 
of working hours many are real nice guys. As Gilbert and Sullivan put it: 
When the felon's not engaged in his employment -
Or maturing his felonious little plans -
His capacity for innocent enjoyment -
Is just as great as any honest man's . . . • 
When the enterprising burglar's not a-burgling -
When the cut-throat isn't occupied in crime -
He loves to hear the little brook a-gurgling -
And listen to the merry village chime . . . . 
THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE, act II (chorus omitted). Yet fine feelings usually do not exculpate. 
Regulatory offenses often are clearly wrong and committed with knowledge of their wrong-
fulness, as in the cases of asbestos, the Ford Pinto, the Dalkon Shield, Love Canal, and 
thalidomide. See notes 46-48 infra and accompanying text. 
27. A random sample of23 OSHA noise violations revealed an average abatement period of 
two years and numerous additional extensions. P. 139. Between the enactment of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act in 1970 and 1982 there were a total of 12 criminal prosecutions, or 
an average of one a year, each one following the death of a worker. These prosecutions resulted 
in three acquittals, one hung jury, and the conviction of eight corporate defendants, seven of 
which pleaded either nolo contendere or guilty. Only two individual defendants were convicted, 
both after pleas of nolo or guilty, and both were sentenced to probation. The nine corporate 
defendants convicted on ten counts were fined a total of $48,500, or an average of about $5390 
per defendant and $4800 per count. Note, A Proposal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act: The Limitations of Punishment and Culpability, 91 YALE L.J. 
1446, 1448-49 & n.17 (1982). In the first seven years of the Act, OSHA sought only nine injunc-
tions; it obtained four, was denied one, and accepted consent decrees in four. Id. at 1462 n.79. 
On the inadequacy of civil penalties, see R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTii 
Acr: ITS GOALS AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS 63 (1976); Rothstein, OSHA After Ten Years: A Re-
view and Some Proposed Reforms, 34 VAND. L. REv. 71, 108-10 (1981); Viscusi, The Impact of 
Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 117, 133-36 (1979). The average 
civil fine amounted to $37.44. M. MACCARTHY, REFORM OF OcCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTii POLICY 12 (1983). 
The number of OSHA inspections gradually increased from 1972 until 1976, when it dropped 
by a third and remained at the latter level through 1980. The number of violations cited dropped 
by more than half as a result. However, the average penalty per violation increased during this 
period from $23.40 to $192.60. W. VISCUSI, supra note 15, at 18-19. In the first year of the 
Reagan administration, fiscal 1981, the number of inspections declined by another 10%. Kel-
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Bardach and Kagan also deplore procedures and practices that 
might seem the essence of democracy to others. Under the heading of 
"toughness," they bemoan the fact that 
many statutes and judicial decisions expanded citizen-group rights to 
participate in the regulatory policymaking process; stipulated that 
agency decisions must be made in public session, after open public hear-
ings; held that agency rulemaking decisions must be based on a publicly 
disclosed evidentiary record; and made agency rules appealable to the 
courts by almost any "aggrieved citizen. "28 
The Freedom of Information Act expands the access of citizens, includ-
ing investigative reporters, to agency inspection records. [P. SS.]29 
To encourage complaints, agencies are forbidden to reveal the complain-
ant's name, and in many regulatory schemes, discrimination by the en-
terprise against complaints is a punishable offense. [P. ss.p0 
They also condemn mandatory labelling of packages, such as the 
warnings on cigarettes, characterizing it as 
a mechanism whereby the government forces sellers to undertake an un-
man, Enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health Regulations: A Comparison of Swedish and 
American Practices, in ENFORCING REGULATION 97, 117 (K. Hawkins & J. Thomas eds. 1984). 
Between 1980 and 1983, serious citations fell by 47%, willful citations by 92%, and penalties by 
78%. Testimony of Margaret Seminario, Associate Director, Department of Occupational 
Safety, Health and Social Security, AFL-CIO, before the House Committee on Government Op-
erations Subcommittee on Manpower and Housing, Nov. 3, 1983, quoted in L. Stearns, Volun-
tary Compliance Schemes: A New "Mix" of OSHA Priorities 5 (unpublished 1984). 
In the regulation of water pollution in Britain, which Bardach and Kagan cite as a model of 
"reasonableness," the maximum penalties until recently were £100 for a summary conviction and 
£200 following an indictment in the Crown Court; these were "universally regarded by staff of all 
ranks as inconsequential as deterrents for all offenders except the most impecunious of farmers." 
Hawkins, supra note 9, at 48; see also K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REG-
ULATION AND THE SOCIAL DEFINmON OF POLLUTION (1984) (reviewed in this issue). 
As an example of what toughness might mean, consider the following. Precision Specialty 
Metals Inc. pleaded no contest to illegally dumping 4000 gallons per day of hexavalent chro-
mium, a carcinogenic waste, and corrosives into city and county sewer systems in Los Angeles. 
The prosecutor maintained that the dumping was willful, as evidenced by the company's action 
in building a second illegal discharge system when it believed that the first had been discovered. 
The penalty was $325,000 in fines, of which $25,000 will defray the cost of hauling away contam-
inated soil and $250,000 will reimburse the city and county for the cost of cleanup. The com-
pany's vice president was sentenced to 120 days in jail, to be served on nights and weekends to 
allow him to keep his job. The plant manager was required to perform 1000 hours of community 
service. And the company was required to spend $34,410 to buy a full page advertisement in the 
Wall Street Journal to acknowledge its culpability. Polluting Firm Ordered to Advertise Its Of-
fense, L.A. Times, Jan. 31, 1984, § 1, at l, col. 1. But even substantial penalties may have little 
impact. See A Waste Hauler Under the Gun: Giant Waste Management is Flourishing Despite 
Lawsuits and Fines, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1984, at C4, col. 3 ($10 million fine for company with 
annual sales of $926.8 million and net earnings of $103.3 million). 
28. P. 54 (footnote omitted). 
29. Adeline Levine made effective use of state and federal freedom of information acts to 
uncover much of the story of Love Canal. See A. LEVINE, LovE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, 
AND PEOPLE 4, 173 (1982). 
30. Workers hardly abuse this protection. According to O.S.H. DEC. (CCH), there were no 
cases brought to protect workers from retaliatory action in 1972, 1973, or 1974, and an average 
of fewer than seven cases a year between 1975 and 1980. Workers remain very fearful of em-
ployer retaliation. See note 119 infra and accompanying text. 
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compensated program of public education - or propaganda, depending 
on one's viewpoint - thereby turning their packages into minibillboards 
for messages designed to persuade rather than to prevent deception. [P. 
259.]31 
Finally Bardach and Kagan criticize the ''potential for abuse" of 
the right of workers to refuse highly dangerous work, suggesting that 
"it could lead to considerable labor-management-OSHA conflict" (p. 
230). 32 And they note with concern that safety stewards in Sweden 
have the power to halt production "on any machine or assignment 
they consider unsafe"33 - ignoring evidence that this power rarely is 
invoked and certainly is not misused. 34 On the basis of these unproven 
assertions that regulatory power leads to abuse, Bardach and Kagan 
conclude that "the formalized statements of general normative beliefs 
incorporated in legal regulations by the institutions of the state may 
not correspond closely to the norms of social responsibility found in 
society."35 In other words, although the regulatory regime was en-
acted by Congress, Bardach and Kagan argue that it does not deserve 
respect because it deviates from "norms of social responsibility" -
although once again they offer no evidence for the content of these 
norms, who holds them, or how they deviate from the regulations. 
But although Bardach and Kagan attack regulation for causing 
inefficiency in the form of inspections, record keeping, and dysfunc-
tional precautions, they are even more critical of the tendency they 
attribute to regulation to undermine the responsibility of the "trustee-
ship stratum" (pp. 28-29, 321-23). This notion, though barely de-
scribed, appears to be the keystone of the "well-ordered society," in 
which individuals whose roles should entitle them to respect wield pa-
ternalistic authority. Examples include the safety engineer, the univer-
sity administrator, the marine biologist, the plant foreman, "teachers, 
doctors, hospital administrators, factory food inspectors, plant manag-
ers, fire chiefs, auditors, journalists, public school principals, city plan-
ners, nurses, presidents of large corporations, nuclear safety engineers, 
31. I wonder how Bardach and Kagan would feel about grants by the U.S. Department of 
Energy to private groups that promote nuclear energy, or expenditures of more than $25 million 
for the same purpose by private utilities. See C. PERROW, supra note 11, at 350. In both in-
stances government forces taxpayers and consumers to pay for corporate propaganda with which 
many of them disagree strongly. 
32. P. 230 (emphasis added). Of course, Bardach and Kagan offer no evidence of abuse. 
Furthermore, they totally fail to consider the normative issue: should workers be compelled to 
accept extreme danger by the threat of being fired for refusing to work? See note 126 infra and 
accompanying text. 
33. P. 231 (footnote omitted). 
34. See Fleischauer, supra note 9, at 311 n.157 (work stoppages dropped from 167 in 1978 
and 171 in 1979 to 99 in 1980); Kelman, supra note 27, at 115 (anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the power is invoked 100 times a year, but its significance is largely symbolic); Stearns, Fact and 
Fiction of a Model Enforcement Bureaucracy: The Labour Inspectorate of Sweden. 6 BRIT. J.L. & 
SOCY. 1, 14-18 (1979). 
35. P. 319 (emphasis added). 
784 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:772 
lawyers, and so on" (p. 322). What are we to make of such a 
hodgepodge? What do nurses and nuclear safety engineers, fire chiefs 
and presidents of large corporations have in common? Bardach and 
Kagan are not simply confused, though they may be incoherent. The 
underlying unity is revealed in their assertion that these people are 
"the cultural carriers of the idea of responsibility" (p. 322), which they 
define as "doing what one judges to be right in a problematic situation 
involving someone else's welfare."36 Members of the "trusteeship stra-
tum" are accustomed to exercising authority, to having their opinions 
respected: nurses dominate patients, foremen command workers, fire 
chiefs decide whom to hire, and so on. Regulation challenges this au-
thority. Thus, "[a]n instance of regulatory unreasonableness can ... 
be experienced as an instance of government-imposed injustice" (p. 
28). Such experiences are "infuriating," and the result may be "the 
erosion of self-confidence and morale on the part of the private trustee-
ship stratum" (pp. 28-29). 
To put the matter somewhat more systematically: injustice is not 
inflicted by the powerful on the weak - bosses compelling workers to 
endure unsafe conditions, employers engaging in racial discrimination, 
industry polluting our environment, producers endangering consum-
ers. Rather, injustice is inflicted on the powerful by the weak when 
their governmental surrogates (regulators) seek to compel the power-
ful to obey the law. What corporations "experience" as injustice is 
assumed to be injustice - the clearest possible indication that the au-
thors are apologists for capital. The powerful are accustomed to com-
mand; governmental challenges to their authority undermine their 
"generalized commitment ... 'to comply with the law'" (p. 113), 
which cannot have been very strong. Threats of nullification are in-
voked by the powerful every time the powerless attempt to curtail 
their "prerogatives" or to limit their "discretion." Such threats were 
invoked by the slave states before the Civil War and by the champions 
of segregation during the civil rights movement and are being renewed 
today in the form of capital flight and runaway plants in response to 
demands by workers, consumers, and environmentalists. 
If regulation is not th~ solution but the problem, what is the solu-
tion? First, we should place more reliance on those familiar alterna-
tives, the market and liability rules (pp. 9-11, 60-61). The authors 
attribute market failure to lack of information. 
Information that affects the decisions of even a small number of indi-
viduals can exert large pressures on producers, since the mechanisms of 
the marketplace make producers especially sensitive to changes in the 
marginal demand for their products or for jobs in their workplaces. [Pp. 
243-44.] 
Yet Bardach and Kagan do not support government intervention to 
36. P. 321 (emphasis added). 
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ensure adequate information. 37 First, they maintain that the market 
already offers sufficient incentives to entrepreneurs to disseminate 
safety information: "[m]anufacturers who want to make safety a sell-
ing point will go to some lengths to advertise this feature" (p. 250). 
Few manufacturers seem to find safety an effective "selling point," 
however, for it hardly figures prominently in their advertising. The 
problem, of course, is that advertising one's own safety or the dangers 
of a competing product or service simultaneously alerts consumers 
and workers to risk. 38 Second, the authors claim that people already 
have as much information as they want. The assumption that "[ w ]e 
are awash in a sea of ignorance and therefore vulnerable to any and 
every predatory move by producer and employer interests . . . is al-
most surely further from the truth" than the assumption that "[t]he 
marketplace plus word-of-mouth communication channels probably 
manage to supply nearly all the information needs and wants of nearly 
all the citizenry; hence there is not much left of general interest for 
mandatory disclosures to disclose" (p. 249). The authors offer no em-
pirical evidence for this extraordinary conclusion. 39 Third, informa-
tion only causes trouble, because its intended beneficiaries do not 
know how to use it: "dramatically stated blanket warning labels on 
drums of solvents containing substances such as benzene often get 
workers upset and reluctant to use them, even though no hazard is 
37. See notes 20, 31 supra and accompanying text. The Reagan administration agrees. The 
Federal Trade Commission recently decided not to require used car dealers to inform potential 
purchasers of known defects. F.T.C Rejects Defects Stickers for Used Cars, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
15, 1984, at A22, col. 4. 
A National Academy of Sciences study in 1984 found that we have adequate information 
about the hazards of only 10% of 3350 pesticide ingredients, 2% of 3410 cosmetics ingredients, 
18% of 1815 pharmaceuticals, 5% of 8627 food additives, and 11 % of 12,860 other commercial 
chemicals with sales of at least a million pounds a year. Salpukas, A Three Mile Island for 
Chemicals, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1984, at sec. 3, col. 3. 
38. Bardach and Kagan "demonstrate" the incentive to warn by reference to Volvo's adver-
tisements. P. 250. But what would they make of the deliberate decision by the world's second 
largest automobile manufacturer, the Ford Motor Company, to hide the design defect in the 
Pinto? See note 46 infra and accompanying text. For a dramatic account of the extraordinary 
lengths to which Japanese automobile manufacturers went in order to conceal dangers and the 
obstacles encountered by the campaign to force disclosure and obtain regulation, see Otake, Cor-
porate Power in Social Conflict: Vehicle Safety and Japanese Motor Manufacturers, 10 INTI.. J. 
Soc. L. 75 (1982). 
Even when consumers do change their preferences in response to perceived risk, they often 
are responding to the actions of regulators and courts, and the level of safety secured remains 
unacceptable. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. manufactures Bendectin, a drug that claims to 
alleviate morning sickness. More than 33 million prescriptions have been written since the FDA 
approved it in 1956. Recently the drug has been blamed for birth deformities. Some 600 lawsuits 
have been filed. Sales ofBendectin dropped from 3.4 million prescriptions in 1979 to 1.9 million 
in 1981. 400 Suits Against Drug Firm to Be Heard by 1 Jury, L.A. Times, June 11, 1984, § 1, at 
3, col. 4. But this decline was caused by the lawsuits, which publicized the alleged link. Further-
more, if the charge is true, should Merrell Dow have continued to sell at the 1981 rate of 1.9 
million prescriptions a year? 
39. For poignant testimony that workers want more information than they receive, see notes 
96-97, 101-02 infra and accompanying text. For an eloquent moral defense of that demand, see 
M. GIBSON, WORKERS' RIGHTS 28-56 (1983). 
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posed under the circumstances ... " (p. 263). Hence the market 
works adequately even without the regulation of disclosure. 
The fiction of the market as the guarantor of optimum safety has 
been exploded so often40 that I will limit my criticisms to the inconsis-
tencies within this book. Bardach and Kagan acknowledge that infor-
mation often is withheld until the consumer already is hooked (p. 
245). They contradict their claim that mandatory disclosure can exert 
large pressures on producers: because "disclosure policies may di-
rectly affect only a small percentage of the consumers and workers 
whose interests are to be protected. . . . regulated enterprises may not 
take their disclosure obligations very seriously; they may treat non-
compliance as a 'mere technical' violation" (p. 266). The authors sys-
tematically confuse workers with consumers and real choices (such as 
how to spend leisure time) with highly constrained behavior (habitual 
use of tobacco or alcohol, driving to work, residing in a polluted envi-
ronment).41 In the end, they seem less concerned that the market 
work than that its participants believe it is doing so: 
Although there is no conclusive evidence that the [Securities and Ex-
change Acts of 1933 and 1934] have prevented fraud and price manipu-
lation . . . they seem to have bolstered the widespread belief that the 
SEC is an effective antifraud enforcer, and this belief has probably con-
tributed to the pool of social trust necessary to maintain a healthy com-
mercial system.42 
If the market is the first line of defense against danger, liability 
rules should be the principal backup system. Bardach and Kagan 
make all the usual mistakes in exaggerating the efficacy of liability 
rules as a deterrent. By conceding that "the liability system probably 
does not in fact force all enterprises to 'internalize' all the social costs" 
(p. 273), they strongly suggest that liability rules do internalize most 
such costs. But the opposite is true. Repeated empirical studies over 
the last half century have shown that liability rules internalize hardly 
any of the accident costs of entrepreneurial activity43 and have only 
the most problematic effect on behavior.44 The very evidence that 
40. See, e.g., Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J. L. & SocY. 199, 203·06 
(1981). 
41. See C. PERROW, supra note 11, at 312-13. 
42. P. 244 (emphasis in original). 
43. See, e.g., ROYAL CoMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PER· 
SONAL INJURY, REPORT (1978); A. CoNARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATI, C. VOLTZ & R. 
BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CosTs AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE EcoNOMICS OF 
PERSONAL INJURY REPARATION (1964); B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE 
FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977); D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. 
LLOYO-BosTOCK, P. FENN, P. CoRFIELD & Y. BRITfAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR 
ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984) [hereinafter cited as D. HARRIS]; Abel, £'s of Cure, Ounces of 
Prevention, 13 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1985) (review of D. HARRIS, supra); Franklin, Cha· 
nin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Persona/ Injury Litiga-
tion, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961). The bulk of this evidence long antedates the present book. 
44. Liability rules, like the market, control effectively only if victims or potential victims 
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Bardach and Kagan themselves adduce to demonstrate the deterrent 
effect of liability rules actually reveals its failure. They claim that 
"[m]anagers . . . are well aware of recent multimillion dollar damage 
awards for personal injury or concentrated environmental dam-
age. . . ."45 But then they have the brazen effrontery to cite as sup-
port for that in terrorem effect the Pinto, asbestos, and Buffalo Creek 
disasters (p. 334 n.8), when for years before the injuries Ford knew the 
gas tank might explode, Johns-Manville knew asbestos caused lung 
damage and cancer, and the Pittston Corporation knew its dam was 
likely to collapse, yet each disregarded the danger despite the threat of 
liability.46 They have the nerve to claim that liability for workers' 
compensation "would seem to provide considerable incentive to cut 
accident rates and severity" (p. 356 n.3), when it is notorious that such 
payments grossly and systematically undercompensate workers, 
thereby encouraging employers to expose workers to risk.47 And they 
possess complete information about the risks to which they have been exposed or the injuries 
they have suffered. Regulation may be necessary to transmit this information. But agencies 
under the Reagan administration appear reluctant to notify those at risk precisely because they 
fear that victims will sue employers or manufacturers. The National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health has compiled a list of 66 studies involving 200-250,000 workers who might 
benefit from learning about their exposure to toxic substances but have not been notified. One 
reason is cost: a $1.3 million item for notification, to be included in the budget of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, was cut at the insistence of the White House. But another 
factor is the fear of lawsuits. Dr. Glenna M. Crooks, deputy to the Assistant Secretary of DHSS 
(of which NIOSH is part), asked in a memorandum: "Does it make any difference that in Ni-
osh's 1980 Augusta pilot notification program [which informed chemical plant workers of the 
increased risk of bladder cancer as a result of exposure to beta-naphthylamine], more than $300 
million in litigation claims have reportedly been filed against the companies involved?" 'Cruel 
Cover-Up' on Job Poisons Charged to U.S., N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1984, at 19, col. 1. Responding 
to criticism of the agency's failure to notify, Dr. Edward N. Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary for 
Health (and Crooks' immediate superior), said: "we do not intend to yell fire in a crowded 
theater." Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1984, at 22, col. 5. But perhaps he should 
tell the people in the theater that it is on fire before they burn to death. 
On the difficulty of changing government behavior through liability rules, see P. SCHUCK, 
SUING GOVERNMENT: CmzEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983). On the difficulty of 
changing corporate conduct, see Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). 
45. Pp. 60-61. I have argued elsewhere that large tort judgments perform the symbolic func-
tion of creating the impression that liability rules overcompensate victims, when they do just the 
opposite. Abel, supra note 40, at 207. To the extent that such judgments have any effect, they 
direct the concern of entrepreneurs to catastrophes rather than the routine carelessness that 
causes the vast majority of injuries and illnesses, see note 89 infra and accompanying text, and 
they encourage entrepreneurs to avoid liability, not risk. Abel, supra note 40, at 204. If manag-
ers are aware of multimillion dollar awards, they also may know that most tort judgments are 
very small: half of the plaintiffs' awards in one study were under $8000. M. PETERSON & G. 
PRIEsr, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS (1981), quoted in INSTITUTE FOR 
CIVIL JUSTICE, A REPORT ON THE FIRST FOUR PROGRAM YEARS 18 (1984). 
46. On the Ford Pinto, see Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 18; 
on asbestos, see note 48 infra and accompanying text; on Buffalo Creek, see K. ERIKSON, EVERY-
THING IN ITS PATH: DEsrRUCTION OF CoMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD (1976); 
G. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976). 
47. On the inadequacy of workers' compensation, see P. BARTH & H. HUNT, WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES (1980); R. CoNLEY & J. NO-
BLE, JR., WORKERS' CoMPENSATION REFORM: CHALLENGE FOR THE 80s (1980); P. NONET, 
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haye the shamelessness to assert that lawsuits by the victims of expo-
sure to asbestos "would seem to provide a strong incentive for ade-
quate care by chemical companies in the future,"48 without 
mentioning that Johns-Manville, the principal culprit, and several 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY (1969); R. 
VICTOR, L. COHEN & C. PHELPS, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE SAFETY: 
SOME LESSONS FROM EcoNOMIC THEORY (1982); Gellhom & Lauer, Administration of the New 
York Workmen's Compensation Law, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 204, 564 (1962); Sincere, Processing 
Workers' Compensation Claims in Illinois, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REsEARCH J. 1073; Note, Com-
pensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1980). The most thorough 
historical investigation to date of the British workers' compensation system found no evidence 
that its introduction enhanced employee safety. P. BARTRIP & s. BURMAN, THE WOUNDED 
SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY: INDUSTRIAL COMPENSATION POLICY 1833-1897, at 46-53 (1983); see 
also Atiyah, Accident Prevention and Variable Premium Rates for Work-Connected Accidents -
JI, 4 INDUS. L.J. 89 (1975). The Report of the National Committee of Inquiry on Compensation 
and Rehabilitation in Australia also rejected the notion that workers' compensation premiums 
paid by employers affected their safety practices. See Gunningham & Creighton, Industrial 
Safety Law in Social and Political Perspective, in LEGISLATION AND SOCIETY IN AUSTRALIA 
146, 153 & n.10 (R. Tomasic ed. 1980). 
48. Pp. 274-75 (footnote omitted). The asbestos tragedy, which Bardach and Kagan cite as 
an example of how well the tort system controls negligence, actually shows just the opposite. The 
dangers of asbestos have been known for more than half a century. Indeed, discovery by plain-
tiffs' lawyers in recent litigation revealed a 1935 exchange of letters concerning contemporary 
British studies of the dangers of asbestos. The president of Raybestos-Manhattan wrote the gen· 
eral counsel of Johns-Manville: "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are." The 
latter replied: "I quite agree with you that our interests are best served by having asbestosis 
receive the minimum of publicity." Chen, Asbestos Litigation is a Growth Industry, THE ATLAN· 
TIC, July 1984, at 24, 26, 29. Yet the asbestos manufacturers ignored the dangers and exposed 
workers and consumers to enormous risks. It is estimated that between 154,000 and 450,000 
people will die as a result of exposure to asbestos before the year 2015. As of March, 1983, 
24,000 lawsuits had been filed. It is estimated that the number will reach between 83,000 and 
178,000 by the year 2010 and that total liability will fall between 8 and 87 billion dollars. J. 
KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF AsBESTOS LITIGATION 9-10 
(1983). 
It is hard to sustain a belief in the efficacy of tort liability as a control mechanism in light of 
the staggering risks capitalists have inflicted in their drive for profits. In the early l 970's, A.H. 
Robins Company manufactured and sold 2.5 million Dalkon Shields, which have been held re· 
sponsible for pelvic inflammation, miscarriages, sterility, and death. A former Robins quality 
control supervisor has testified that he told the company that the design was flawed as early as 
the summer of 1971. But the company notified the FDA of the problem only in 1973. In mid· 
1974, at the FDA's request, Robins ceased production and wrote to all doctors, hospitals, and 
birth control organizations. Yet only in 1980 did Robins recommend to doctors that they re· 
move the shield from women still using it. The FDA did not get around to issuing such a 
recommendation until August, 1983. Finally, in October, 1984, Robins began a recall campaign 
directed to women through television commercials and newspaper advertisements. Why the slow 
response? Apparently because Robins thought it could beat the rap. But by September, 1984, 
more than 10,000 claims had been filed. Of the 36 that had gone to trial by March, 1984, Robins 
had won 19 and lost 17. In at least one case a jury verdict for 13 plaintiffs was reversed by a 
federal district judge on the ground that the women were more at fault for using the device than 
the manufacturer was for selling it. The defendant's strategy had been to divide the plaintiffs, 
requiring each to sue separately, and to stall endlessly in response to requests for documents. 
This was successful until Miles Lord, Chief Judge of the District of Minnesota, compelled the 
defendant to produce documents that revealed detailed knowledge of the danger by high corpo-
rate officials, exposing Robins to the threat of punitive damages not covered by their insurance. 
By the end of September, 1984, Robins had paid $244.7 million to settle 7,600 lawsuits, and 
another 3,768 claims and cases still were pending. In November, 1984, 198 cases pending before 
Judge Lord were settled for about $38 million. See Siegel, Miles Lord: Champion or Zealot?, 
L.A. Times, June 28, 1984, § 1, at 16, col. 3; Accord Cited in Dalkon Cases, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 
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other defendants have declared bankruptcy in an effort to evade 
liability.49 
Yet Bardach and Kagan downplay the weaknesses of the liability 
regime (pp. 277-82). Indeed, they think it too severe. They deplore the 
fact that patients overcame the professional conspiracy of silence pro-
tecting physicians from malpractice liability, they raise the spectre of 
"defensive medicine," and they applaud the new limitations on mal-
practice liability and damages - limitations that prevent tort claims 
from acting as effective deterrents to physician negligence (pp. 283-
87). so They misstate the effect of statutory rules on the determination 
ofliability and urge "limits on the impulses of juries" (p. 289).51 They 
1984, at 18, col. 5; Drive Begins on Dalkon Shield, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1984, at 21, col. l; L.A. 
Times, Jan. 9, 1984, § 1, at 2, col. 2. 
If corporations with the standing in the business co=unity enjoyed by Pittston, Johns-
Manville, Robins, and Dow are "bad apples," see text at note 9 supra, then the concept is 
meaningless. 
49. Johns-Manville's example has inspired others besides asbestos manufacturers. See Ha-
ger, High Court Hears Toxic-Waste Case, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1984, § 4, at 2, col. l; Escape 
Hatch? Bankruptcy in pollution case, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 35 (bankruptcy petition of William 
Kovacs, owner of Chem-Dyne Corp., a toxic waste disposal facility). 
50. The authors note that the ratio of malpractice suits per New York physician more than 
doubled between 1969 and 1974. P. 284. But they do not mention that only about 4 plaintiffs in 
10 won those suits. See Peterson & Priest, supra note 45, at 18. Although the number of mal-
practice claims increased from 1966 to 1975, it declined thereafter. The size of the average claim 
grew at an annual rate of 12.4% for physicians and 18.9% for hospitals between 1971 and 1978, 
P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1982), 
quoted in INSTITUTE FOR Clv!L JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 31, but the rate of inflation for medi-
cal costs during those years was almost as high. Furthermore, the limitations on medical mal-
practice litigation, successfully lobbied through state legislatures by state and national medical 
associations, have had a dramatic effect on tort claims: 
When a state moved to cap verdicts or eliminate specific dollar requests by plaintiffs or 
permit payment of awards for future losses in periodic installments, the net effect was to 
reduce trial awards by 30 percent, cut the average out-of-court settlement by 25 percent, 
raise the portion of cases dropped from 43 percent to 48 percent, and reduce the share of 
cases going to actual verdict from 5.1 to 4.6 percent. Relaxing the ban on evidence of collat-
eral sources of compensation for injuries appeared to reduce trial awards by 18 percent. 
Statutory limits on contingent fees charged by plaintiffs' attorneys also aided in depressing 
settlement amounts - and somewhat increased the proportion of cases dropped. 
P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE REsOLUTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: RE-
SEARCH REsULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1982), quoted in INSTITUTE FOR Clv!L JUSTICE, 
supra note 45, at 32. However, many such limitations have been declared unconstitutional by 
state supreme courts. See, e.g., Wright v. DuPage Hosp. Assn., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 
(1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 
125 (N.D. 1978). 
Another recent limitation on ''.jury discretion" was the grant of sovereign immunity to gov-
ernment contractors sued by civilians injured by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests. Ten vic-
tims won a total of $2.66 million in May, 1984. But recent legislation converts all pending and 
future suits against an atomic test contractor into suits against the federal government. Such suits 
must be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which allows no jury trial and no punitive 
damages. New Act Restricts Atomic Test Suits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1984, at 26, col. 1. It is not 
clear whether this law also will affect suits like that won by the widow of an employee of the 
Department of Energy at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant, who convinced a court that her 
husband had died of cancer caused by handling radioactive materials for 15 years, even though 
his exposure was within federal limits. Compensation Ordered in Atomic Worker's Death, L.A. 
Times, Apr. 25, 1984, § l, at 7, col. 4. 
51. Juries do not seem very impulsive. A major study of Chicago jury verdicts in tort cases 
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endorse a Republican bill "to make product liability rules more mod-
erate and uniform" (p. 287) but fail to disclose that the bill would 
obstruct, and often prevent, recovery by injured consumers, nullifying 
the deterrent effect of products liability law.52 And they resort to the 
customary charge that many accidents "can more easily and inexpen-
sively be avoided by the relevant class of plaintiffs," who therefore 
must be denied recovery in order to motivate them to adequate con-
cern for their own safety (pp. 286-87). Having supported a number of 
legislative changes in tort liability rules that have been sought or se-
cured by defendant lobbies (physicians, insurers, chambers of com-
merce), Bardach and Kagan hypocritically praise such rules as "better 
shielded from the political and bureaucratic pressures that often make 
direct regulation unreasonably rigid" (p. 271). 
Bardach and Kagan clearly believe that the best government is 
that which governs least: "[u]nder many conditions, we might simply 
wish to opt for no regulation at all" (p. 304). They accept liability 
rules and mandatory disclosure only to the extent that these may fore-
stall direct regulation (p. 290). Furthermore, they are confident that 
technological progress and economic growth, far from increasing the 
need for regulation, actually diminish it: 
"Richer is safer," wrote Aaron Wildavsky, and it is true that if we sim-
ply encourage plant modernization through economic incentives, many 
aspects of product and worker safety and environmental protection will 
continue to improve. [P. 304.] 
Aware that the victims of risk - workers, consumers, and all those 
affected by environmental degradation - favor greater regulation, 
they disregard that broad consensus: "If the costs . . . of prevention 
are very much in excess of benefits, and ifthere are no overriding egal-
itarian or paternalistic considerations to offset this imbalance, then one 
might reasonably say that more mandated prevention was socially irre-
sponsible. " 53 In order to justify substituting their own judgment for 
between 1960 and 1979 found that half of all claims were for less than $900 in medical expenses 
and less than $1200 in lost earnings (in 1979 dollars), and half of all awards were less than $7800 
in toto. M. PETERSON, CoMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY 
11-13 (1984). Jury awards were closely related to both medical expenses and lost earnings -
items not easily manipulated. Id. at 26. Severity of injuries had little effect on the likelihood of 
success. Id. at 41. Nor have awards been growing faster than inflation. Id. at 46. The major 
increase in compensation for medical expenses in catastrophic injuries appears to reflect new 
capacities for heroic intervention. Id. at 50-51. 
52. The Kasten Bill (Product Liability Act, S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)) would over-
ride all state laws governing liability for defective products and preempt that subject entirely. It 
would replace strict liability with negligence, shift the burden of proof to plaintiffs where some 
state laws had placed the burden of disproof on defendants, eliminate the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel (thereby requiring every victim of an identical product to establish independently that 
the product was unreasonably dangerous), preclude liability where the defect is obvious, intro-
duce the defense of comparative fault on the part of the user or consumer, and reduce damages 
for work injuries by the amount to which the victim would be entitled under workers' 
compensation. 
53. P. 320 (emphasis added). 
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that of democratic politics, they invoke the scientism of "independent" 
cost-benefit analysis (p. 312).54 And they urge that both the promul-
gation and enforcement of regulations be shielded from the influence 
of victims, though not of those who victimize them. 55 
The authors propose a number of regulatory reforms to promote 
these ends. First, they wish to diminish the power of victims. Work-
ers should ask the company to improve safety rather than demand 
compliance with OSHA rules or threaten inspections and sanctions 
(pp. 107-09).56 Inspectors should not waste their time responding to 
worker complaints, and when the agency must do so it should use less 
experienced inspectors. 57 When inspectors visit plants they should 
"spend proportionately more time talking with managers and profes-
sionals in the regulated enterprise and interviewing operating employ-
ees" and "proportionately less time looking at physical facilities in 
search of violations. " 58 Bardach and Kagan would expand the role of 
the union as intermediary between workers and managers because 
"[r]outing complaints through the union safety specialists ... seems 
to cut down on unreasonable employee complaints" (p. 232). The rea-
sons are not hard to find. 
A full-time labor union safety representative in a large factory said that 
he often tours the plant at break time to look for safety problems so that 
he can avoid getting bogged down with "piddling complaints" from 
workers and concentrate on things he thinks are most important. More-
over, he says, it hurts his credibility with company engineers when he is 
obliged to bring up minor problems raised by workers. 59 
As a result, "the worker or his representative has some clout," and 
there is "worker-management consultation over safety issues."60 Such 
deference by workers to union officials and management is consistent 
54. For a critique of the "independence" of cost-benefit analysis in "professional judgment," 
see B. FISCHHOFF, s. LICHTENSTEIN, P. SLOVIC, s. DERBY & R. KEENEY, ACCEPTABLE RlsK 
61-78 (1981). 
55. They recommend closed-door bargaining over regulations, pp. 179-81, and shielding reg-
ulators from a political environment that demands toughness. P. 217. 
56. Of course, workers already do just this. See note 113 infra and accompanying text. 
57. Pp. 166-68. The Reagan administration appears to have adopted this recommendation. 
According to the new Field Operations Manual, "OSHA no longer actively pursues formal com-
plaints." The proportion of worker complaints in Region 2 that resulted in inspections dropped 
from 64% in 1980 to 45% in 1982. Stearns, supra note 27, at 24. Workers long have complained 
about the difficulty of securing an OSHA inspection. See notes 121-23 infra and accompanying 
text. 
58. P. 149. Inspectors will talk to employees only in the presence of a manager. P. 147. 
Employees find this very inhibiting. See note 122 infra and accompanying text. 
59. P. 167 (emphasis in original). This view of the union as a mechanism for controlling 
workers is consistent with recent critical writing on labor law. See, e.g., Klare, Judicial Deradi-
calization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 
MINN. L. REv. 265, 318-39 (1978); Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 
YALE L.J. 1509 (1981). 
60. P. 230 (emphasis added). 
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with the authors' belief that the workplace contains no irreconcilable 
structural conflicts. 
The authors' second proposal is regulation by the "good inspec-
tor," who might better be called the "nice inspector," for he is accom-
modating rather than principled. 61 This inspector does not invoke 
legal powers but instead relies on "elements of exchange - respon-
siveness, forebearance, and information" to secure behavioral changes 
in the industry.62 He looks for basic problems rather than rule viola-
tions (p. 102). He does not insist upon engineering controls to en-
hance safety and recommends their introduction only as equipment is 
replaced for purposes of modernizing production. 63 If the inspectors' 
attitude and modus operandi are to change, they must gain greater 
technical competence: not more academic education but more experi-
ence with the regulated industry in order to make them more "reason-
able" (pp. 128, 155). They also should become more specialized, 
because, "on balance, the potential gains from specialization, in terms 
of both effectiveness and reasonableness, would probably be larger" 
than the "improved perception and renewed toughness" that come 
from rotating inspectors. 64 To increase experience it is necessary to 
reduce turnover; we can do this by offering inspectors continuing edu-
cation, even though the starting salary of an OSHA inspector in the 
1970's was $10,507 and the ceiling was $19,263 (p. 156 n.11). On the 
other hand, there is no need to increase the number of inspectors, 
although each OSHA inspector was responsible for 1515 sites in 1980: 
"seemingly low budgets may actually be close to some optimum . . . 
[because] the preponderance of regulated enterprises usually are good 
apples."65 Finally, it is essential to dampen the "zeal" and "self-
61. For a critical description of a "reasonable" regulatory agency, see Silbey, Case Processing: 
Consumer Protection in an Attorney General's Office, 15 LAW & SocY. REV. 849 (1980-81); 
Silbey, The Consequences of Responsive Regulation, in ENFORCING REGULATION 145 (K. Haw-
kins & J. Thomas eds. 1984). 
62. P. 131. But if the regulator has less to offer than the regulated, this exchange will favor 
the latter. 
63. Pp. 137-39. The preference for personal protective equipment over engineering controls 
parallels the preferences of managers. See D. NELKIN & M. BROWN, WORKERS AT RlsK (1984), 
infra Part III, at 69-70. 
64. P. 158. The authors offer no evidence for this proposition. Empirical studies repeatedly 
have shown that capital finds it easier to capture specialized regulatory agencies than general 
purpose agencies. See, e.g., Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive 
Policy: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & SocY. REv. 823 (1977). W.G. 
Carson dicusses this danger at some length. See text at note 84 infra. 
65. P. 162. If evidence is needed to disprove this proposition, Perry, Government Regulation 
of Coal Mine Safety: Effects of Spending Under Strong and Weak Law, IO AM. POL. Q. 303 
(1982), found that increased federal government spending on mine health and safety inspection 
sharply reduced bituminous coal fatalities when regulatory standards were strong (though not 
when they were weak). 
On the inadequacy of the OSHA inspectorate even before the cuts by the Reagan administra-
tion, see Blumrosen, Ackerman, Kligerman, VanSchaick & Sheehy, Injunctions Against Occupa-
tional Hazards: The Right to Work Under Safe Conditions, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 702, 715-16 
(1976); Rothstein, supra note 27, at 94-95. OSHA has sufficient staff to inspect each manufactur-
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aggrandizement" of the agencies themselves (p. 309). The authors 
urge that every regulatory advisory board create a seat for an econo-
mist, who can be counted on to favor industry (p. 312). And they 
recommend that agencies be "obliged periodically to decrease the 
compliance costs of existing regulations by some percentage, say 5-10 
percent every three or four years."66 
But workers will continue to complain even if no one listens, and 
even the most industry-oriented agency may enforce some rules. The 
ultimate solution, then, is to hand regulation over to the industries 
themselves. 67 The justification for doing so is the authors' belief that 
capital's concern for worker and consumer safety and environmental 
protection varies with the character of the enterprise - there are good 
apples and bad. The primary goal, therefore, must be to identify and 
influence the good apples, to "affect the consciousness, organization, 
or culture of the regulated enterprise by "training . . . middle- and 
lower-level personnel" to be more "sensitive" to concerns that other-
wise would amplify the demand for external regulation. 68 The organi-
zational solution is to appoint "full-time quality assurance specialists 
'who sit equally on the organizational chart with production and sales 
ing and construction establishment only once every ten years. M. MACCARTHY, supra note 27, 
at 12. In the first three years of the Reagan administration, a third of OSHA field offices were 
closed, and the number of inspectors dropped by a third, worksite inspections by 16%, follow-up 
inspections by 88%, and hours spent on health and safety inspections by 20-25%. See Testimony 
of Margaret Seminario, Associate Director, Department of Occupational Safety, Health and So-
cial Security, AFL-CIO, before the House Committee on Government Operations Subcommittee 
on Manpower and Housing, Nov. 3, 1983, quoted in L. Stearns, supra note 27, at 5. 
In California, Cal-OSHA staff has been cut 20% as a result of a reduced budget and a hiring 
freeze imposed by Governor Deukmejian. The legal department, charged with enforcement, has 
been cut from 13 lawyers to 4, and the state attorney general's office has refused to defend Cal-
OSHA when employers challenge penalties. The right-to-know law is not being enforced; 
although 20,000 information sheets on potentially dangerous chemicals have been submitted by 
manufacturers and employers, 21 additional employee years would be required to go through 
them and ascertain if they were in compliance. Jacobs, Cal-OSHA Comes to a Crossroads, L.A. 
Times, Dec. 5, 1983, § 1, at 3, col. 4; Jacobs, Legislators Rap 'Gutting' of Worker Safety Pro-
grams, L.A. Times, Dec. 9, 1983, § 1, at 3, col. 2. 
The parallels with nineteenth-century England are striking. In 1835, 11 inspectors and sub-
inspectors were responsible for 4,000 factories employing more than 350,000 workers; a quarter-
century later half again as many staff had to inspect 6,378 factories and more than twice as many 
employees. Bartrip & Fenn, The Evolution of Regulatory Style in the Nineteenth Century British 
Factory Inspectorate, 10 J. L. & Socv. 201, 209 (1983). 
66. P. 314. But they do not insist that levels of pollution or rates of injury and illness be 
reduced proportionally. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
67. The Star, Try, and Praise programs adopted by OSHA under the Reagan administration 
seek to do this. However, because they offer little incentive to the enterprise, a total of only 34 
companies have qualified under them. On the other hand, 1600 companies have sought exemp-
tion from civil and penal sanctions by requesting on-site consultations. See L. Stearns, supra note 
27, at 7-13. 
68. P. 124. The authors' own uncertainty about the public spirit of the "trusteeship stratum" 
is revealed by their proposal to buy compliance through abatement contracts with polluters. See 
p. 296. For a critique contrasting such economistic approaches to regulation with legalistic 
mechanisms, see Braithwaite, The Limits of Economism in Controlling Harmful Corporate Con-
duct, 16 LAW & SocY. REv. 481 (1981-82). 
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... [and whose] words are as important as those of the production 
manager' " (pp. 226-27). It also may be useful to appoint a public 
director to the board of the corporation "to oversee programs designed 
to ensure good faith compliance with regulation .... "69 Once the 
"consciousness, culture, and organization" of the enterprise has been 
professionalized in this fashion, it will be possible to turn over the task 
of regulation to the enterprise itself, for "[t]he best-developed social 
expression of self-regulation is the ethic of professionalism."7° Yet 
there is no reason to believe that self-regulation by industry will be any 
more effective than self-regulation by the professions. 71 Bardach and 
Kagan nonetheless urge a return to industry ·responsibility for setting 
the standards by which they should operate (p. 217), even though the 
inadequacy of these standards was one of the reasons for the creation 
of OSHA, 72 and the authors acknowledge that encouraging trade as-
sociations to formulate and police rules accelerates cartelization of an 
industry (pp. 173-74, 220-23). 
Bardach and Kagan are selective in their search for evidence -
interviewing managers but not workers - and undaunted by the ab-
sence of evidence when they leap to conclusions. They consistently 
present "might be" as "is." They portray the world as harmonious 
but for workers who misperceive their own best interests and regula-
tors who possess flawed characters or are carried away by youthful 
inexperience. Their capitalists are reasonable and well-intentioned but 
misunderstood and reviled. Misguided efforts to coerce them will just 
get their backs up and undermine the responsibility of the "trusteeship 
stratum." They must exercise authority, and they will do so benignly 
if only they are left alone. 
II. RISKY BUSINESS 
In The Other Price of Britain's Oil, W.G. Carson returns our atten-
tion to where it belongs - to those who inflict risk on others and the 
69. P. 227. The authors seem to believe that corporate organization charts determine power 
rather than reflect it. 
70. P. 316. A striking instance of the refusal of corporations to accept, or even to consider, 
conservation measures that actually served their self-interest is the battle between the Environ-
mental Defense Fund and Pacific Gas and Electric. It took several years and four lawsuits to 
compel P.G.& E. to adopt the innovations. When a senior attorney for E.D.F. asked a senior 
vice president of the company whether it would have been possible to persuade P.G.& E. of the 
desirability of the idea through less adversarial means, the latter replied: "There was no confi-
dence in your motives. If you had published [the idea] you would have had to invent an E.D.F. 
to push it. An interesting book is not going to tum any large institution around." Roe, How to 
Mold the Nation's Utilities: Building Profits into Conservation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, § 3, at 
2, col. 3; see also D. ROE, DYNAMOS AND VIRGINS 197-200 (1984). 
71. For critiques of self-regulation by lawyers, see Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethi-
cal Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REv. 639 (1981); Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, 1981 Wis. 
L. REV. 1117, 1177-82. 
72. See D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY STRUG-
GLES IN THE UNITED STATES 79-91 (1978). 
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nature and magnitude of the risks they create. This superb case study 
of the dangers of exploring and producing North Sea oil demonstrates 
that the legal framework of regulation always was inadequate, that the 
regulatory agency was underfunded and structured in a way that facil-
itated capture by the industry, that the latter consistently, unreasona-
bly, and successfully resisted safety precautions and opposed 
enforcement procedures, and that the·penalties it incurred were laugh-
able and ineffective. It is a sorry story of the failure of regulation in 
the real world - an invaluable antidote to the myth of oppressive 
regulation purveyed by Bardach and Kagan. 
Carson begins by situating the phenomenon of risk within the 
political economy of the industry that generates it. The injuries and 
deaths suffered by workers on North Sea oil rigs were caused by the 
decisions of multinational oil corporations and the British state, which 
benefitted from them. Carson explains these choices through a rich 
description of the political and economic environment of the 1960's. 
The feverish search for oil and gas - a constant throughout much of 
the last half century - was intensified in Britain during this decade by 
its accelerated industrial decline (p. 86), its need to redress the disas-
trous balance of payments, the government's determination to defend 
the pound from devaluation (p. 88), and anxieties about the cost and 
reliability of other energy sources after the formation of OPEC in 1960 
(p. 90). The discovery of North Sea oil seemed an almost miraculous 
solution to these intractable problems: it quickly reversed the balance 
of payments (p. 108), and tax revenues (supplemented by royalties 
once the British National Oil Corporation was created) provided in-
come desperately needed by the rapidly expanding welfare state, espe-
cially during the 1973-1974 recession (p. 114). But the urgent need of 
the British state to reap these benefits meant that the leases and roy-
alty agreements it negotiate9. with the major oil companies were not 
nearly as attractive as they might have been had the demand for reve-
nue been less pressing (pp. 99-101), and the government was forced to 
rely on North American sources for capital (pp. 122-25) and on the 
industry for technology (pp. 125-26). The result was a relationship of 
dependency, similar to that which prevails between third-world states 
and multinational corporations (pp. 116-17). 
These same political economic variables determined the extraordi-
nary risks to which workers on the North Sea oil installations were 
exposed.73 Even when one excludes the uniquely treacherous diving 
operations, the exploration and production of offshore oil was the most 
dangerous industry in Britain at the time (pp. 21, 23-24). 
Apologists for the industry typically attributed these dangers to 
73. Lisa Stearns offers a similar political-economic analysis of the risks in British coal mines 
as demand for coal changes and ownership is socialized. See Stearns, A Priority for Worker 
Health and Safety: Lessons from the British Coal Mines, 7 CoNTEMP. CRlsES 271 (1983). 
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the hostile environment - injuries and deaths were the necessary, if 
tragic, price demanded by a vital resource (pp. 42-45). 74 This view 
also maintained that work on the oil rigs attracted risk-preferential 
types, derogatorily termed "cowboys," who were neglectful of their 
own safety and actually enjoyed confronting danger (p. 45). 75 But 
Carson shows that, although the environment undoubtedly was diffi-
cult and the workers were drawn by high salaries, injuries and deaths 
actually were caused by something much more mundane. Most acci-
dents were the result of hazardous working conditions deliberately and 
consciously created by managers in order to maximize profit. (Yes, 
even nationalized industries competing within a capitalist economy 
obey such an imperative.) Workers were exposed to extremes of fa-
tigue, cold, hunger, and boredom during their twelve-hour days and 
fourteen-day tours of duty on the oil rigs (pp. 72-73).76 Moreover, 
partly because of these harsh conditions, turnover was very high - as 
many as forty percent of each new shift were wholly inexperienced (p. 
74).77 There were constant pressures to maintain production at all 
costs (pp. 74-75). Workers were reluctant to insist on safety precau-
tions, both because they thought such requests would be ignored and 
because they feared retaliation (p. 76).78 
This disregard for safety is reflected in the accident statistics. An 
internal company survey revealed that half of all injuries were caused 
by "falling, slipping or tripping" (p. 49). Carson's own analysis of the 
229 fatal and serious accidents between 1975 and 1978 showed that 
thirty percent were falls and twenty-five percent were the result of 
crushing. Moreover, the industry failed to report or correct known 
problems until an accident had occurred (pp. 53, 58, 172).79 A review 
of sixty-six fatal, serious, or dangerous accidents attributed sixty-four 
74. This sort of apology is hardly new. Consider the reasoning of a famous nineteenth·cen-
tury American case that denied compensation to the owner of buildings destroyed when a steam-
boiler on a neighbor's property exploded and was catapulted onto his land: 
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give up many of my 
natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender by every other 
man of the same rights, and the security, advantage and protection which the laws give me. 
So, too, the general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed use and possession 
of my real estate . . • are much modified by the exigencies of the social state. We must have 
factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. 
Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873). 
75. See note 15 supra. . 
76. See also D. NELKIN & M. BROWN, WORKERS AT RISK (1984), infra Part III, at 73, 83, 
85 (exhaustion, routine and fatigue create greater likelihood of danger); Hale & Perusse, Atti-
tudes to Safety: Facts and Assumptions, in SAFETY AT WORK 73 (J. Phillips ed. 1977). 
77. On the extraordinarily high rates of turnover - up to 100% per year - found in harsh 
working conditions, see P. BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PAR-
TICIPATION 63 (1968); D. MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CoNTROL IN AMERICA 41 (1979); SPE· 
CIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, WORK IN 
AMERICA 100-01 (1973). 
78. See notes 117-20 infra and accompanying text. 
79. See note 114 infra and accompanying text. 
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percent of them to human error (p. 171). Equally correctable errors 
seem to explain the Alexander Kielland tragedy, in which 123 men 
were killed on a Norwegian oil platform (p. 288). And the inadequacy 
of the regulatory scheme must accept partial responsibility for the 
poor safety record of North Sea oil. Both industry resistance and reg-
ulatory failings were products of the dominant role played by private 
capital and of the political pressures for rapid production. 80 
Although exploration of North Sea oil was well advanced by 1963, 
there was no statutory framework for regulating the industry until the 
end of the decade. During the 1960's, the only regulatory device avail-
able to government was the draconian sanction of license suspension, 
which, precisely because of its severity, never was used (p. 148).81 It 
took a full five years after the Sea Gem disaster of 1965, in which 
thirteen men were killed, before the necessary legislation was enacted; 
during that time another fourteen men died (p. 150). Even then, an-
other seven years had passed before the government implemented this 
legislation (p. 157). Much of the thirteen-year delay was attributable 
to the government's desire to "carry the industry with us" - to 
achieve that cooperative relationship between regulator and regulated 
so highly valued by Bardach and Kagan (p. 152). 82 The industry ex-
acted a high price in human life and suffering in return for its dilatory 
and reluctant cooperation. The legal framework ultimately con-
structed never was adequate. There were major lacunae: regulation of 
the construction stage, of the "flotels" in which workers lived, and of 
the pipelines all were omitted (p. 235). Overlapping and conflicting 
jurisdictions among governmental bodies caused delays and oversights 
(pp. 264-65). And because of the industry's novelty and the rate of 
technological change, regulations were drafted in very general terms 
and supplemented by "guidance notes," a scheme that allowed pre-
cisely the flexibility touted by Bardach and Kagan (p. 178). Unfortu-
nately, it also made the ·regulations legally unenforceable and 
permitted the industry to ignore them. 83 
The administrative structure also reflected the pressures for pro-
duction. The government had to choose between a horizontal frame-
work, in which a specialized safety agency regulated many disparate 
industries, and a vertical framework, in which the government agency 
80. For a similar analysis of the struggle over the regulation of worker health and safety in 
Canada, see Tucker, The Law of Employers' Liability in Ontario 1861-1900: The Search for a 
Theory, 22 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 213 (1984); Tucker, supra note 15. 
81. The inverse relationship between the severity of the penalty and the frequency of sanc-
tions has been observed in other regulatory contexts. See, e.g., Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Cli-
ents, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND REsEARCH J. 917, 998-99. 
82. See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying text. 
83. For an analysis of the way in which unenforceability was built into the substantive con-
tent of Australian coal mine safety regulations through the inclusion of phrases such as "reason-
ably practicable," see Hopkins & Parnell, Why Coal Mine Safety Regulations in Australia are not 
Enforced, 12 INTL. J. Soc. L. 179, 182 (1984). 
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responsible for promoting oil production also controlled safety (pp. 
159-60). In concrete terms, this was a choice between extending the 
jurisdiction of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which already 
regulated mining, agriculture, and nuclear energy among other indus-
tries, or giving responsibility to the Petroleum Engineering Division of 
the Department of Energy (PED) (pp. 187-92). The latter argued that 
it could move more quickly, keeping pace with a rapidly changing 
technology, whereas the HSE was too slow and bureaucratic (pp. 202-
03). Ultimately, the PED won the jurisdictional battle (p. 290). The 
price, of course, was subordinating safety to production - precisely 
the "reasonableness" and concern for the costs of regulation that 
Bardach and Kagan champion (pp. 163-66). Yet even with the exper-
tise the PED acquired through its production responsibilities, it had to 
rely on the industry for technical information and was hampered by 
the secrecy that competition engendered (p. 171). The PED was 
grossly understaffed: the first inspector was appointed in 1966, the 
second in 1968, and the third in 1971 (p. 172).84 Whereas HSE inspec-
tors were recruited from a broad background, trained on the job, ro-
tated every five years to avoid excessive identification with the 
regulated, and often spent their entire careers in the agency, most 
PED inspectors were drawn from the industry and returned to it after 
a brief stint in government (pp. 174, 205). 85 
Another set of structural factors limited regulatory efficacy. The 
private companies involved in oil exploration and production soon 
formed a trade association to negotiate safety matters collectively (p. 
181). But workers remained unorganized. By the end of 1977, unions 
had gained recognition on only six of the twenty-eight rigs; three years 
later less than twenty percent of the work force was organized (p. 
213).86 The explanations for this poor showing include jurisdictional 
bickering among unions, a transient workforce enjoying high wages, 
and of course the isolation of the oil rigs (pp. 214-15).87 But much of 
it must be attributed to vigorous opposition from employers, who 
often denied organizers access to the installations (p. 217). The low 
level of unionization, in tum, was one reason for the failure of the 
HSE to gain responsibility for regulation (p. 223). And the PED, un-
like the HSE, made no effort to consult with unions, nor did its en-
abling legislation provide for union safety representatives or 
committees (pp. 213, 222).ss 
84. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. 
85. This is exactly what Bardach and Kagan advocate. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING 
BY THE BOOK, supra Part I, at 128, 155. 
86. This figure is very low for British industry, although it is average for American. 
87. A deckhand told Nelkin and Brown: "Regulating ships at sea is nearly impossible. The 
captain is the boss, and there is no authority beyond the captain. That's it." D. NELKIN & M. 
BROWN, WORKERS AT R.lsK, infra Part III, at 128. 
88. Too much should not be expected from safety representatives. Interviews with those 
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These inadequacies in the regulatory framework reappeared in its 
actual operations. The PED, like the industry itself, was preoccupied 
with the fear of a major catastrophe such as the Sea Gem or Alexander 
Kielland, which could have unpredictable political consequences; the 
industry and the regulators both tended to ignore the routine careless-
ness that caused most accidents and injuries (pp. 176, 241).89 Inspec-
tors were hampered by the need to give advance notice of visits to 
offshore rigs (p. 239).90 Inspections were ·conducted and safety in-
structions were drafted without reference to legal authority and there-
fore failed to lay a sufficient foundation for subsequent prosecution 
(pp. 246-47). Indeed, the PED criticized the HSE's tendency to look 
for violations and to measure regulatory efficacy by the number of 
prosecutions (p. 249). The PED's determination to accelerate pro-
duction led it to issue certificates of fitness permitting drilling and pro-
duction before construction was complete (p. 243). Because of 
uncertainty about the jurisdiction of Scottish courts over offshore in-
stallations, all Fatal Injury Inquiries were suspended until new en-
abling legislation could be passed in 1976; although the latter 
explicitly was made retroactive, none of the intervening deaths was 
investigated (pp. 262-63). 
If regulatory authorities exercised their powers cautiously, the in-
dustry was not timid about resisting. Companies incorporated in the 
United States vigorously contested the jurisdiction of British agencies 
and courts (pp. 237-38).91 And both American and British companies 
sought to avoid civil and criminal liability by constructing a compli-
cated web of employment contracts with subcontractors and by invok-
ing the statute of limitations after stalling off claims (pp. 269, 275, 
278). 
The combination of passive regulators and an obstructionist indus-
try produced the inevitable results. In the years 1978-1980, there were 
only thirteen prosecutions (pp. 249-50). Six were filed under earlier 
legislation, five of which resulted in acquittals, and two-thirds of the 
defendants in the sixth were found not guilty. Less than half of all the 
appointed under the Health and Safety at Work Act elicited pessimistic evaluations of their 
efficacy: "The management lets you know what they want you to know"; "we're still treated like 
mushrooms - kept in the dark and fed with rubbish." L. Stearns, From Promise to Action: A 
Case Study in the Role of Subordinate Legislation 24-25 (unpublished 1982). 
89. This fear of political exposure affects all regulatory agencies and may explain why prose-
cutions tend to follow deaths or serious injuries - the agency wants to show that it has not been 
caught napping, when obviously it has. Throughout the 1950's the British Chief Inspector of 
Factories initiated two-thirds to four-fifths of all its prosecutions with respect to machinery fol-
lowing an accident. Veljanovski, Regulatory Enforcement: An Economic Study of the British 
Factory Inspectorate, 5 LAW & POLY. Q. 75, 90-91 (1983). We have seen already that all crimi-
nal prosecutions under OSHA followed deaths at work. See note 27 supra. 
90. Bardach and Kagan deplore unannounced inspections, p. 106; workers believe that notice 
to employers nullifies the value of the inspection. See notes 122-23 infra and accompanying text. 
91. It is worth noting that resistance was not a reaction to unreasonable regulation but oppo-
sition to any regulation. 
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defendants (10 out of 23) were found guilty (8 after pleas, 2 after trial). 
Of these, one was admonished, and nine were fined amounts between 
£25 and £400- an average of £214 each (pp. 267-68). Such leniency 
in an industry whose annual earnings were in the billions of pounds 
dramatically illustrates the conventionalization of crime (p. 231).92 
Nor did regulatory agencies make use of their extrajudicial powers: 
they "very rarely" closed down an installation for violating regulations 
and instead granted temporary exemptions or issued partial certificates 
(pp. 251-52). 
The Petroleum Engineering Division of the British Department of 
Energy is the "good inspector" lauded by Bardach and Kagan. It is a 
model of "reasonableness." It is at least as concerned with production 
and with industry costs as with safety. Many of its inspectors have had 
experience within the industry, and many look forward to future em-
ployment there. The PED administers a regime of legislation and reg-
ulations formulated in cooperation with the industry. It rarely 
prosecutes violations, and even then it can seek only trivial sanctions. 
It refrains from using its summary powers. 
This reasonable regulatory regime oversees the industry with the 
worst safety record in the country. The injuries and deaths it con-
dones are caused by carelessness, overwork, inexperience and haste, 
not by technological limits or an ungovernable environment. Both the 
regulatory regime and the industry reflect the political economy 
within which they operate: the market for oil, the structure of produc-
ers, the distribution and control of other energy reserves, the vulnera-
bility of the British economy, the exigencies of the Tory Government, 
and the weakness of labor. It is these factors, not the character of 
regulatory personnel, that produce the risk and determine the nature 
of the regulatory response. Carson's book, in sum, is a powerful anti-
dote to Bardach and Kagan's mystifications. 
III. LISTENING TO VICTIMS 
Dorothy Nelkin and Michael S. Brown provide another essential 
perspective ignored or distorted by Bardach and Kagan. In Workers at 
Risk· Voices from the Workplace, they allow seventy-five workers to 
speak at length about the experience of being exposed to toxic chemi-
92. This phenomenon is pervasive. I already have presented American evidence. See note 27 
supra and accompanying text. In the State of South Australia, there were only six successful 
prosecutions for health and safety offenses in 1977. In the State of Victoria in 1977, 106 prosecu· 
tions secured 88 convictions, but the average fine was only A$95.97. Gunningham & Creighton, 
supra note 47, 157 n.25. In the nearly seven decades between 1897 and 1965 there were 255 
prosecutions for safety violations of the New South Wales Coal Mines Regulation Act, an aver· 
age of3.7 a year, of which three-quarters were successful. The maximum fine was £35, but many 
were much lower. During the same period, however, the state successfully prosecuted 26 miners 
for safety violations, and mine owners successfully initiated an average of 24 private prosecutions 
a year, or more than 8 times as many as the successful state prosecutions of owners. See Hopkins 
& Parnell, supra note 83, at 188-89. 
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cals. The authors make no pretense of "objectivity" or "balance." If 
justification for such partisanship is needed, Bishop Desmond Tutu 
phrased it cogently in a speech at UCLA Law School a week before he 
was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace: if you want to know whether 
the noose is too tight, ask the victim, not the hangman. 93 The authors 
do not claim that these voices are representative, for the sample was 
not chosen randomly. But they do argue that "the meaning and social 
context of human behavior, the importance of subjective experience, 
and the connections between such experience and behavior" are indis-
pensable for understanding the response to risk, and they offer this 
testimony as evidence of relations between consciousness and behavior 
that demand further exploration (p. ix). 94 
In presenting these insights, I will borrow an analytic framework 
from an article on the transformation of disputes.95 Workers exposed 
to toxic chemicals first must name the risk; next they must assign 
blame for it - to their employer, themselves, or simply the nature of 
things; and finally they must make a claim - for a lower level of risk, 
for control over exposure, for information, for compensation, or for 
some other solution. It is important to understand the factors that in-
fluence each stage in this transformation. 
Naming the hazards of the workplace may be the most difficult 
step, for worker ignorance can foreclose any possibility of corrective 
action. These workers accuse their employers of withholding essential 
information: failing to warn of the risks associated with PCB (p. 11), 
methyl chloroform (pp. 38-39), and epoxy (p. 62); concealing dangers 
- for instance, by adding a mint smell to a toxic chemical (p. 28); 
refusing to allow workers to see the results of their medical examina-
tions (pp. 19, 158);96 obscuring long-term risks, especially of cancer 
93. Charles Perrow, supra note 11, at 315-28, offers a convincing argument for taking seri-
ously the ways in which potential victims assess risk. Furthermore, fear itself is an important 
phenomenon. Recent epidemiological studies show that the combination of a highly demanding 
job environment and low control over that environment produces stress and cardiovascular dis-
ease. Karasek, Baker, Marxer, Ahlborn & Theorell, Job Decision Latitude, Job Demands, and 
Cardiovascular Disease: A Prospective Study of Swedish Men, 11 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 694 
(1981); see also R. CAPLAN, s. CoBB, J. FRENCH, JR., R. HARRISON & s. PINNEAU, JOB DE-
MANDS AND WORKER HEALTH: MAIN EFFECTS AND OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENCES (1975). 
Anxiety and loss of control in the confrontation with large-scale technological disasters, like 
Three-Mile Island, also produce stress. See Baum, Fleming & Singer, Coping with Victimization 
by Technological Disaster, J. Soc. ISSUES, No. 2, 1983, at 117. Courts have taken cognizance of 
this connection by awarding damages for anxiety and emotional distress. See, e.g., Ferrara v. 
Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958) (compensation for misdiagnosis of cancer and 
subsequent cancerphobia). 
94. In this respect the book continues the tradition of such revealing accounts as S. TERKEL, 
WORKING (1974). 
95. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blam-
ing, Claiming . ..• 15 LAW & SocY. REV. 631 (1980-81). 
96. In Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 
P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980), the California Supreme Court held that an employee could 
sue Johns-Manville in tort, even though workers' compensation generally was the exclusive rem-
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(pp. 152, 167); and providing safety information that is either too tech-
nical and complex or too general and incomplete, when they offer any 
at all (pp. 59-61, 151, 153, 156).97 
Workers confess that their lack of control leads them to deny dan-
gers and minimize risks (pp. 45, 86, 93-96): 
There are no options. So we keep our mouth shut. We never talk about 
the issue with our friends who work for the railroad. . . . And when we 
do mention it, they say, "Oh, you sound like those Vietnam veterans," or 
"Shut up, we don't want to hear it." [P. 93.] 
I've passed the right-to-know stuff around the shop. Two or three guys 
looked at it and threw it down. They say, "Hey, you're scaring me. I 
can't come to work anymore." [P. 95.] 
This reluctance to acknowledge risk appears to be associated with a 
wide variety of personal characteristics. Younger workers believe 
themselves to be indestructible,98 self-sufficient, and capable of dis-
pensing with union support, yet they, most of all, want to enjoy the 
endless life they see before them (pp. 40-41, 106, 119).99 Older work-
ers boast of surviving and argue that others should be able to endure 
similar risks; looking forward to retirement, they do not want to make 
waves (pp. 40, 106). Discussions among workers are an essential part 
of the process by which vague personal anxieties are named as con-
crete risks, but men share their concerns less openly than women, both 
because they are less sociable and because they fear to admit weakness 
(pp. 34-36, 46-47).100 Workers who view themselves as professionals 
and the self-employed are much more willing to trust the judgment of 
employers and manufacturers (pp. 151, 166-67, 179-80). 
Yet if some deference to employers still prevails, workers increas-
ingly demand the right to know the risks to which they are exposed (p. 
164). Worker consciousness of risk has been expanded greatly as a 
result of the activities of the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
edy, where the employer deliberately concealed the fact that the employee was suffering from the 
effects of exposure to asbestos. 
97. Residents of Love Canal also found the information supplied by the state health depart-
ment to be confusing and inadequate. See A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 75-76. 
98. For a social psychological study of belief in invulnerability and of the consequences of 
victimization for such a person, see Perloff, Perceptions of Vulnerability to Victimization, J, Soc. 
ISSUES, No. 2, 1983, at 41. 
99. Love Canal residents displayed similar characteristics. See A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 
195. Economic models predict the same pattern. See w. VJSCUSJ, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS, 
supra note 15, at 24-33. 
100. But women also can be silenced by trying to fulfill male expectations; the sole woman 
industrial painter in a male crew outdid the others in courting risk to prove herself a regular guy. 
Pp. 62-63. 
On the importance of exchange with and support by those who have experienced similar 
misfortunes, see Coates & Winston, Counteracting the Deviance of Depression: Peer Support 
Groups for Victims, J. Soc. ISSUES, No. 2, 1983, at 169. In the Love Canal tragedy, those who 
lived in the area most severely affected by chemicals found each other indispensable: "We are the 
only ones who can really understand each other. We can hardly talk to anyone else about how 
we really feel." A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 186. 
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tration. 101 In 1969, a year before OSHA was established, only thirty-
eight percent of production workers believed they were exposed to 
risks; eight years later the proportion had more than doubled (pp. xv-
xvi). 
But workers do not rely passively on regulatory agencies to alert 
them to and protect them from risk. Interaction among workers is 
even more important in identifying and responding to hazards. Un-
ionized workers consistently are more aware of risk than their unor-
ganized counterparts (p. 24). The following account clearly illustrates 
how discomfort is transformed from a personal failing into a collective 
grievance: 
I started working at the museum about a year ago and immediately 
got various ailments that I never had before. . . . I thought it was stress 
because I hadn't worked full time for a few years. I just explained to 
myself that I wasn't cut out for full-time work and was having a hard 
time adjusting to it. . . . Then two other people got the same kind of 
rash and we all worked on the same floor. That made me think that 
there was something in the air. 
. . . I started asking everyone if they had any symptoms and found 
an incredible number of people on the staff with dizziness and eye 
problems. . . . Other people who thought they were getting hay fever 
now began to think that it was this chemical. We were talking one day 
at coffee and came up with 17 out of 42 people who work here who had 
mysterious rashes. [P. 36.] 
On the other hand, when workers constantly are moved around the 
plant, the interaction necessary to uncover common problems is dis-
rupted (p. 179). Those who suffer personal illness or injury or the 
death of a loved one have the strongest possible incentive to pursue the 
search for causes and to reject easy solutions (pp. 32-33, 176). Some 
workers engage in library research and even conduct their own epide-
miological studies (pp. 32-34,. 49).102 Their findings are strikingly con-
sistent with those of professional scientists, although workers still 
underestimate the chronic effects of long-term exposures (p. 31). 
Once workers have named the risks that threaten them they must 
take the next step of attributing blame. 103 Just as employers hide the 
101. The same occurred in Sweden as a result of the liberalization of benefits for work-in-
duced illnesses. See Hetzler, Work and Sickness.....: Ideology and Law, 24 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 75 
(1981). 
102. See also A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 87-94; c. VAN STRUM, A BITfER Foo 199-217 
(1983). The mother of a child who died ofleukemia initiated a community investigation of other 
cases in East Woburn, Massachusetts. With the help of her local pastor she uncovered six cases 
in the immediate neighborhood and a total of 12 in East Woburn. The Center for Disease Con-
trol estimated that the probability of six cases within a half-mile radius was .01. A subsequent 
epidemiological study by the chair of the biostatistics department at the Harvard School of Pub-
lic Health confirmed that finding and linked the high incidence of leukemia to trichloroethylene 
in the local water supply. DiPema, Leukemia Strikes a Small Town, N.Y. Times Mag., Dec. 2, 
1984, at 100. 
103. For an interesting study of the way in which the media, government prosecution and 
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risks from workers, so they also seek to blame the workers for them: 104 
They try to make you feel the problem is yours alone, even the chemical 
problems. If you come down with a rash, even if 10 people come down 
with a rash, it's all your individual problem. [P. 57.] 
The company has a big safety program, but it's very superficial - they'd 
rather put the burden on the employee. Think safety, wear your hard 
hat, do this, do that. Everything is the employee's fault. [P. 64.] 
Employer safety precautions reflect and reinforce this attribution by 
focusing on employees rather than on the work environment. They 
prohibit smoking rather than reducing chemical fumes (p. 55). Most 
important, they require employees to use personal protective equip-
ment rather than introducing engineering controls (pp. 69-70, 80 n.2). 
The reasons are not only the relative cost of each and their effects on· 
production but also the fact that subsequent failure to use protective 
equipment allows the employer to blame the employee. The scientific 
community strongly reinforced this bias until recently (pp. 50-51). 
In light of this, it is not surprising that many workers do blame 
themselves when they suffer injury or illness.1°5 
The first thing that occurs to you is that your fear is making you make 
up things. I have to say to myself over and over, "Seventeen people out 
of forty have rashes"; I have to repeat these numbers to legitimize my 
complaints. If I didn't know other people with those complaints I'm 
sure that I would have convinced myself that I was causing it by being 
just nervous or exhausted. People tend to blame themselves. [Pp. 60-
61.] 
Some become obsessed with their personal life styles, hoping to devise 
a charm against the danger: 
The only way I can protect my health is to change my life-style. So, I 
watch my diet, I have my wheat germ and my apple, my orange and my 
carrot. My carrot is my cancer stopper. They say carrots are good for 
you. They contain vitamin A. I don't drink coffee or eat cake. I eat my 
apple and my orange. I walk two miles to work. . . . I walk in the rain. 
The only thing I can do is be in good shape, so maybe my body can fight 
things off. That's the only control I have. 
I can't stop what's happening at the plant. [P. 89.]106 
Although workers do behave in ways that aggravate danger, these be-
haviors cannot be considered "voluntary": a hairdresser and an indus-
victim decisions interacted to affect attributions of responsibility in the Pinto crashes, see Swigert 
& Farrell, Corporate Homicide: Definitional Processes in the Creation of Deviance, 15 LAW & 
SocY. REv. 161 (1980-81). 
104. "[T]he designation of human error, or pilot error, is a convenient catch-all for 'mishaps 
whose real cause is uncertain, complex, or embarrassing to the system.' " C. PERROW, supra 
note 11, at 133. 
105. See generally Burman, Genn & Lyons, The Use of Legal Services by Victims of Accidents 
in the Home - A Pilot Study, 40 Moo. L. REv. 47 (1977). 
106. The speaker, an electrician in a chemical factory, was exposed to PGCH and suffers 
from asthma and severe allergic reactions. Pp. 188, 194. 
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trial painter smoked in order to kill the odors of the chemicals that 
surrounded them; the painter also drank to counteract the effects of 
lacquer thinner fumes (p~ 27, 29-30). Having incurred risks that soci-
ety characterizes as voluntary, workers become less concerned about 
the risks imposed on them. A laboratory technician said: 
I understand the nature of risks and know that every cigarette I have 
totally outweighs whatever I could get making up a few micrograms of 
this thing that says, "Shown to cause ... cancer in animals." Isn't that 
awful? Knowledge breeds contempt. [P. 43.]107 
Yet workers acquiesce less readily in the attempt by employers to shift 
responsibility by insisting on personal protective equipment. They 
find such devices intensely uncomfortable as well as intolerable imped-
iments to the tasks they must perform and the production norms they 
must meet (pp. 70-72, 76-78).108 Furthermore, they encounter severe 
social pressures against using protecive equipment: a hair stylist felt 
she could not wear a mask while exposing her customers to the same 
fumes; supervisors and even fell ow workers ridiculed those who took 
precautions (pp. 77-80). 
Economists and employers often argue that workers must accept 
responsibility for risk because they choose to incur it by accepting a 
job. I responded above that this mystification confuses workers with 
consumers.109 The latter sometimes do have real choices, as shown by 
the care that most producers take to protect the patrons of beauty 
salons but not the workers, or the audience in a theater but not the 
stage crew (pp. 17-18, 81). 110 Workers occasionally do appear to make 
meaningful choices. A few accept risk as inherent in work they find 
intrinsically satisfying because they are relatively autonomous: a 
sculptor, a physicist, a firefighter, a rosarian, a self-employed furniture 
restorer, or a deckhand. In addition, at least two women derived satis-
faction from having broken gender barriers: the deckhand and an in-
dustrial painter (pp. 97-99). And occasionally workers illustrate the 
economists' model and accept risk in exchange for higher pay (pp. 85, 
165). 
But most workers incur risk because they see no alternative: all 
107. Workers tend to underestimate routine risks. P. 83. See Hale & Perusse, supra note 76, 
at 78. 
108. Like many others, I can attest to the intense discomfort and inconvenience of protective 
devices even when production norms are self-imposed - as in home improvement. Anyone who 
has tried to operate a pneumatic drill with earmuffs, or a sandblaster while wearing a hood, or 
applied fiberglass insulation or adhesive for floor tiles while wearing a mask will be horrified by 
Bardach and Kagan's suggestion that these are adequate and acceptable protections. 
109. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
110. One reason for this difference is that workers are less likely to complain (because of 
their subordination) and can claim only workers' compensation, which pays a fraction of tort 
damages. Thus, an employer may be willing to expose a worker to the risk of sterilization (which 
causes no wage loss and therefore does not expose the employer even to liability for workers' 
compensation) but not to a mutagen or teratogen, which might produce a deformed child who 
could sue in tort. P. 146. 
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jobs have risks, and workers see little choice among jobs. They are 
lucky to have even one. 
I guess, I probably figure, everybody's going to get it one way or an-
other. . . . I'm not ready to quit my job and go through all the bullshit 
I'd have to go through to get another job when I'm not sure whether it's 
killing me. . . . My field is art and whatever other job I'm gonna get it's 
gonna be the same. [P. 88.] 
. . . Jesus, it's a chemical plant and the lime's there and part of the 
process and no one is going to get rid of the lime. You've got to keep 
that plant running. So what can you do about it except make sure that 
everyday you put your cream on. [Pp. 31-32.] 
Workers stay on the job in order to qualify for pensions, and the 
longer they stay the harder it is to quit (pp. 88, 91). They rationalize 
the decision: "seeing that I had worked with [a potentially mutagenic 
chemical] for maybe five or six years before I knew, the damage that 
could be done was probably already done ... " (p. 40). They feel 
powerless to reduce risk: "if you refuse to do something the guy in 
back of you will go ahead and do it instead" (p. 92). One worker put it 
succinctly: 
You never balance the wage against the risk; you balance the wage 
against the alternative. And the alternative is starving when you're put 
in this situation. That's what's so phony about this cost/benefit analysis. 
[P. 91.]lll 
Given the proportion of workers who do not name the risks they 
incur and the proportion of those who name the risk but fail to blame 
their employers, it is not surprising that the claim rate is so low. Half 
of all workers confronting danger fail to take any action whatever (p. 
113).112 Of those who do, almost all (eighty-five percent) go directly 
to management; only seven percent appeal to a regulatory agency, and 
only six percent report to their unions (p. 113).113 
A number of factors contribute to this passivity. The first, and 
perhaps most important, is employer opposition. Workers see little to 
be gained by complaining when employers stall for years in making 
repairs (pp. 51-52, 54), wait until someone gets hurt (pp. 53, 115),114 
disregard worker warnings (p. 59), display contempt for governmental 
111. This feeling of impotence must have been aggravated during the recent recession. A 
Bureau of Labor Statistics report found that 5.1 million workers who had occupied their jobs for 
at least three years lost those positions because of plant shutdowns or staff cuts between 1979 and 
1984. Two million never were reemployed, of whom 1.3 million still are looking for jobs and 
700,000 have given up. Another 900,000 who found new jobs were earning less money - 60% 
of them at least 20% less. A further 6.4 million people lost jobs they had held less than three 
years. Report Depicts Human Toll of 2 Recessions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1984, at 36, col. 1. 
112. The proportion of those who take some action after suffering injury or illness is equally 
low. See D. HARRIS, supra note 43, at 62. 
113. Thus, workers already do what Bardach and Kagan urge. See text accompanying note 
56 supra. 
114. See text accompanying note 79 supra. 
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safety regulations (p. 56), and seek to cover up dangers (p. 114).m 
Some workers even internalize the employer's perspective: arguing 
that the latter has to make a profit, worrying that insistence on safety 
might close down the plant, and hoping that employer-employee coop-
eration will enhance safety (pp. 65, 169-70).116 But many more refrain 
from complaining out of fear of retaliation: 
If you refuse to use it [a toxic chemical], you might get laid off, fired, or 
suspended, or at the least the boss will remember who you are. So most 
guys don't want to rock the boat. [P. 62.]117 
I wouldn't ever call OSHA. I mean, it's a good way to make your job 
impossible. . . . You wouldn't be able to work here after you did a thing 
like that. [Pp. 130-31.] 
OSHA wouldn't even deal with it, because they said I had to lodge a 
formal grievance against my employer for them even to come out to in-
spect. I didn't want to do that. [P. 131.] 
Others are embarrassed about their disabilities or concerned that these 
will disqualify them from work (pp. 24-25, 142).118 Workers with 
family responsibilities are particularly apprehensive about employer 
reprisals (pp. 92, 94).119 Disabled workers refrain from claiming com-
pensation for the same reason. They find the company physicians who 
115. This does not inspire much confidence in Bardach and Kagan's proposal to trust em-
ployer self-regulation. See notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text. 
Social psychologists explain victim passivity as "learned helplessness." See, e.g., Peterson & 
Seligman, Learned Helplessness and Victimization, J. Soc. ISSUES, No. 2, 1983, at 103. It is a 
rational response, given the low probability that complaint will elicit a meaningful remedy. See 
Kidd & Chayet, Why Do Victims Fail to Report? The Psychology of Criminal Victimization, J. 
Soc. lssUES, No. l, 1984, at 39, 48. 
116. Yet other workers categorically rejected such subordination. Pp. 171-72. The British 
Robens Report also took the view that the interests of capital and labor in worker safety were 
similar, if not identical. CoMMfITEE ON SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK, REPORT OF THE 
CoMMfITEE 1970-1972 (1972). For criticism of the report, see P. KINNERSLY, THE HAzARos 
OF WORK 228-30 (1973); T. NICHOLS & P. ARMsrRONG, SAFETY OR PROFIT (1973); Woolf, 
Robens Report - The Wrong Approach?, 2 INDUS. L.J. 88 (1973). 
117. See also p. 88. It is clear that workers find wholly inadequate the protections against 
employer retaliation that Bardach and Kagan deplore. See note 30 supra and accompanying 
text. 
118. While misfortune sometimes evokes sympathy from others, it often stimulates uglier 
reactions. The residents of Love Canal 
were sometimes ridiculed, told that they had been fools to buy homes at Love Canal, sus-
pected of trying to "make a bundle" from the government, accused of giving the city a bad 
name, sneered at for seeking publicity for its own sake, and feared as contaminated carriers 
of mysterious diseases. The comments and reactions stemmed not only from strangers and 
fellow workers but often from friends and even from relatives. 
A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 185 (footnote omitted). 
The victims of the thalidomide tragedy were similarly embarrassed. See generally THE IN-
SIGHT TEAM OF The Sunday Times of London, SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE STORY OF 
THALIDOMIDE (1979); E. ROSKIES, ABNORMALITY AND NORMALITY: THE MOTHERING OF 
THALIDOMIDE CHILDREN (1972). Parents resisted the characterization of their children as 
handicapped, disabled, or mentally retarded, and this inhibited the formation of groups. But the 
children themselves recognized each other as similar. E. RosKIES, supra, at 144-46. On self-
blame for illness generally, see s. SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978). 
119. By contrast, one elderly male worker felt he could afford to lose his job. P. 129. 
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examine them biased and unsympathetic (pp. 136, 139-42).120 And 
they know that employers successfully resist compensation claims: 
only about forty percent of worker injuries are compensated and only 
two to three percent of worker illnesses; in 1975 only 1.7 percent of the 
1.8 million worker compensation awards were for illness (p. 137). 
Families may be too distraught by the death of a loved one to pursue a 
claim (p. 144), and employers may persuade a worker not to claim by 
offering an easy job during convalescence (p. 143). 
If workers feel it is hopeless to seek safer conditions or compensa-
tion from their employers, they have even less faith in regulatory agen-
cies. We have seen already that only seven percent of those who 
complain, and only 3.5 percent of those who encounter risk, voice 
their complaints to a regulator. One reason, again, is fear of employer 
reprisals (p. 130). But workers also perceive OSHA - the only mean-
ingful regulatory agency - to be weak, slow, inefficacious, and a cap-
tive of the industry. 
OSHA is so underfunded and understaffed that, if you waited for them 
to get around to you, you'd be waiting a good long time. [P. 132.] 
It was obvious that they [NIOSH] had no intentions of stepping on any 
feet in the government .... We're talking about Dioxin and therefore 
about the Agent Orange problem. If NIOSH came up with any dis-
turbing statements about its effect on us, that would be like one small 
weak branch of the federal government sticking a dagger in the heart of 
the Pentagon, which is not a small weak branch of the government. 121 
We had an OSHA inspector come. I couldn't talk to him. The vice-
president of the company followed him around everywhere. [P. 133.]122 
OSHA inspectors come in and they look at something specific. . . . 
[They] never look next door .... The firm can make it look good when 
they have to. . . . If they know it's time for an inspector to come 
around, they treat their people like kings. [P. 134.]123 
Although workers support government regulation and would like to 
see OSHA strengthened (p. 128), they know that ultimately they 
themselves must control risk. 
We have a responsibility 'to teach our children that, just because someone 
told you something is safe, it's not. Just because the federal governn;ient 
says something is okay, doesn't make it great. I don't think they have 
our best interests at heart. I don't trust them. The responsibility has to 
120. See D. BERMAN, supra note 72, at 95-98. 
121. P. 132 (emphasis in original). Compare the competition between the HSE and the PED 
as described by Carson, text following note 83 supra. 
122. Thus, OSHA already appears to be following Bardach and Kagan's advice to talk to 
management, not workers. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
123. In nineteenth-century Britain, inspectors believed that mill owners paid employees at 
railway stations and inns to tell them when the inspector was approaching. Bartrip & Fenn, 
supra note 65, at 211. 
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be ours. [P. 168.]124 
Workers resist paternalism from both their employers and the gov-
ernment. They reject Bardach and Kagan's proposal that a "trustee-
ship stratum" should have "responsibility" for their lives. They 
demand the right to know, confident that they possess the necessary 
expertise to evaluate and use such knowledge, 125 and they insist on 
nothing less than autonomy - the right to control the dangers they 
confront.126 
It's not a privilege to work. It's my right to be able to work. . . . I also 
have a right to know if I'm working with anything that's harmful. I 
should have the choice of whether or not to work with it. [P. 164.] 
124. Disturbing evidence for this skepticism can be found in the federal government's heavy 
reliance on private laboratories to test chemicals. In 1976, the Food and Drug Administration 
discovered errors in the tests performed for it by the largest such enterprise, Industrial Bio-Test 
Laboratories. Investigations by government and the press over the next four years revealed the 
invalidity of most of the thousands of tests that had led to licensing hundreds of chemicals. See 
C. VAN STRUM, supra note 102, at 179-98; see also Curry, FDA Knew Drug Tied to Deaths Was 
Being Used, L.A. Times, May 1, 1984, § 1, at I, col. 1 (failure to recall E-Ferol Aqueous Solution 
until after the deaths of 38 neonates); Drug Maker Pleads Guilty Over Lethal Side Effects, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 14, 1984, at A23, col. 1 (thirty-six deaths and at least 500 severe cases of liver and 
kidney damage linked to Selacryn, approved by the FDA after insufficient clinical tests). 
There is a real danger that government action will induce a false sense of confidence in citi-
zens. Residents of the Love Canal area disregarded noxious fumes and skin rashes because the 
government's decision to build a school on the site and to grant mortgages to homebuyers indi-
cated there was no danger. A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 14. See also Hale & Perusse, supra note 
76, at 83: 
[R]eliance on false safeguards may indicate a basic problem of allocation of responsibility for 
safety; because thinking about our own safety is such a dissonance-producing activity it is 
more comfortable to take any reassurance, however falsely based, that someone else is think-
ing about it for us. 
125. The public values information to the extent that it is involved in collecting the informa-
tion and controlling its production and distribution. See Gricar & Baratta, Bridging the Informa-
tion Gap at Three Mile Island: Radiation Monitoring by Citizens, 19 J. APPLIED BEHA v. SCI. 35 
(1983). 
126. For a persuasive argument that workers should have the right to refuse dangerous 
working conditions, see M. GIBSON, supra note 39, at 57-86. See also Abel, supra note 15, at 702-
10. Workers invoking a right-to-know law may be subject to employer reprisals. A pregnant 
woman employed in making optics asked her boss for a list of the chemicals to which she was 
exposed. When she received no response she asked to be transferred out of the laboratory and 
into an office job until she received the information (as she was entitled to do under a four-year-
old state law). Instead she was dismissed. Her employer claimed he did not know of his legal 
obligation. The woman has since won a court ruling that she was illegally dismissed. Ousted 
Worker Wins a Suit Under Toxic Chemical Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at 42, col. 5. But 
laws like this in 16 states and several municipalities may be preempted by a much weaker federal 
regulation that applies to only half as many workers (and no nonworkers) and to many fewer 
substances. 3 States Say OSHA Rule on Chemicals Weakens Their Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 
1984, at 26, col. 3. 
Those exposed to herbicides also insist on the right to control that exposure. In rural Oregon, 
residents used force against persistent spraying of their homes, farms, and families by trucks and 
helicopters of the U.S. Forest Department. See C. VAN STRUM, supra note 102, at 218-30. A 
small town in northern Illinois, like others in some northern and eastern states, has passed an 
ordinance requiring commercial pesticide applicafors to post a sign 72 hours after applying 
chemicals to lawns, stating, "This lawn chemically treated. Keep children and pets off for 72 
hours." The law has been challenged on equal protection grounds in a lawsuit by the Pesticide 
Public Foundation. Lawn-Care Concerns Fight Pesticide Sign Rule in Illinois City, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 2, 1984, at 73, col. 1. 
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When you do a job day in and day out, you're the expert on the job. You 
know how it runs. Management can design the machine, but the man 
that runs it for 10 years is going to know more about that machine than 
management. [P. 170.)127 
What we need is a system of government that says you can do whatever 
you need to do to protect yourself on your job. [P. 127.] 
Nor are workers interested simply in maximizing their own safety at 
the expense of others, as the economists' view of human nature 
presupposes. 
My wife is very upset about my working with all these chemicals. She 
would like me to quit. But if I were to do that and obtain another job, I 
would be just throwing in the towel, giving up that commitment to a safe 
and healthy workplace. I'd be reducing my own risk of occupational 
disease or accidents, but doing nothing for the workers who remain. 
[Pp. 105-06.] 
I have a responsibility to see that it's a safe place to work. I don't want 
to leave it the same way I found it. [P. 109.] 
In order to take control of their lives, help all workers, and with-
stand employer reprisals, workers must act collectively. The tradi-
tional mechanism has been the union and, more recently, the 
Committees on Occupational Safety and Health that unite rank and 
file workers, union officials, health professionals, and social activists 
(pp. 104-06, 129, 161-62).128 Yet unions have disappointed many. 
Fewer than one in every five American workers belongs to a union. 
Only three international unions have had the interest and resources to 
employ staff with technical expertise in health and safety issues (pp. 
116-17). And, with some notable exceptions, American unionism has 
been preoccupied with bread-and-butter issues rather than safety129 -
a bias intensified by the recession of the 1970's and the Reagan admin-
istration's attack on organized labor. The workers in this book repeat-
edly voice disillusionment: union officials are invisible and 
inaccessible, unions are undemocratic, officials are too quick to use 
grievance procedures that inevitably result in compromise, and unions 
sometimes even discourage workers from claiming compensation (pp. 
117, 119-20, 145). Unions rarely wield their ultimate power: only 
127. Although astronauts originally were intended to be little more than guinea pigs, pas-
sively exhibiting the effects of space travel upon humans and symbolizing man's conquest of 
space without having any responsibility for directing the mission, the intervention of the astro-
nauts in the Apollo 13 mission was all that saved them from death and the mission from disaster. 
See C. PERROW, supra note 11, at 258-81. 
128. See generally D. BERMAN, supra note 72, at 117-75; Theme Issue: Occupational Safety 
and Health, LAB. STUD. J., Spring 1981, at 1. On the role of unions in regulating health and 
safety in England, see P. BEAUMONT, SAFETY AT WORK AND THE UNIONS (1983). 
129. One reason why unions may be unenthusiastic about bargaining over health and safety 
is the threat of being sued for striking bad bargains or failing to enforce the agreements they 
reach. See Drapkin & Davis, Health and Safety Provisions in Union Contracts: Power or Liabil-
ity?, 65 MINN. L. REv. 635 (1981). 
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0.7% of the 3885 strikes in 1980 were sparked by health and safety 
issues (p. 121 n.3). Workers are reluctant to strike for fear of losing 
wages and suffering retaliation (p. 122). Yet they realize that their 
only hope for autonomy is their right to withhold labor. 
[I]f you don't have the right to strike, that is, the right to walk off the job 
and withhold your labor, then your boss is an absolute dictator who has 
the right to kill you because you don't have any choice. [P. 166.]130 
The portraits of risk presented by Nelkin and Brown and by Car-
son are diametrically opposed to the image that Bardach and Kagan 
seek to construct. It is no exaggeration to say that the former speak 
for workers and the latter for capital. Workers encounter extraordi-
nary obstacles in naming the risks they experience, blaming their em-
ployers, and claiming enhanced safety or compensation for damage 
done. Yet capitalists believe it is far too easy to name, blame, and 
claim. Workers feel they voice too few grievances, capitalists that they 
assert too many. Workers claim the right, as victims, to speak out. 
Capitalists denounce such complaints as artifacts of overzealous regu-
lation. Workers claim the expertise that comes from experience, while 
capitalists dismiss such lay pretensions, insisting on formal credentials 
and the scientism of cost-benefit analysis. Workers value collective ac-
tion, through which they share knowledge, overcome fear, and acquire 
power; capitalists extol individualism (for others). Workers perceive 
risk as involuntary and blame those who control their lives; capitalists 
exaggerate individual freedom and blame the victim. Workers fear re-
taliation and experience the workplace as a locus of struggle; capital-
ists proclaim labor-management harmony and promise solicitude if 
workers only abandon their demands. Workers see regulatory agen-
cies as weak and captive; capitalists see them as overbearing and un-
reasonable. Workers demand autonomy; capitalists believe that they 
alone should be autonomous, while workers should defer to the au-
thority of capital and have faith in the paternalism of the "trusteeship 
stratum." Not for the first time do the conclusions of scholars reflect 
which side they are on. 
IV. OLD SLOGANS, NEW STRUGGLES 
The arguments in these three books are depressingly familiar. The 
message of Bardach and Kagan was put more succinctly thirty years 
ago by Charles Wilson, President Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense: 
What's good for General Motors is good for the country. Their solici-
tude for corporations who must stop inflicting risk on workers, con-
sumers, and citizens evokes another memory of the fifties - how 
painful it was said to be for racists to stop discriminating. In opposi-
tion, both Carson's book and that of Nelkin and Brown document 
130. For an example of a successful "work to rule" action (whereby employees adhere to the 
letter of company rules, slowing production), see pp. 120-21. 
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once again how little worker health and safety weighs in the capitalist 
calculus of profit. Yet if the lessons are old, the battles always are 
new. People will not surrender their insistence on autonomy and 
equality in the confrontation with risk. 
